ArrowTheorem.acyclic
defimported Lean
A social welfare function $f$ is acyclic if no profile of transitive voter orderings produces a Condorcet cycle in society's preferences. A cycle occurs when $f(\mathrm{abVotes}(p)) = f(\mathrm{bcVotes}(p)) = f(\mathrm{caVotes}(p)) = 1$ (the cycle $a>b>c>a$) or all equal $-1$ (the reverse cycle).
Statement
set_option maxHeartbeats 800000 in open scoped BigOperators in open BooleanAnalysis in variable {n : ℕ} in def ArrowTheorem.acyclic (f : BooleanFunc n) : Prop
- Defined in
- TCSlib, `ArrowTheorem.acyclic`
- Lean proof
- By Mina, Allan Li, Owen McGinty (from the file's git history), from github.com/Shilun-Allan-Li/tcslib at
c8a02591b1e5(Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.25.0.ArrowTheorem.acyclic← ArrowTheorem.acyclic (TCSlib/BooleanAnalysis/ArrowTheorem.lean:166): verbatim
- Verified
- 07 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 5
- ArrowTheorem.ProfileA profile assigns each of the $n$ voters one of the 6 orderings: $p : \mathrm{Fin}\,n \to \mathrm{Fin}\,6$.
- ArrowTheorem.abVotesGiven a profile $p$, the vote vectors $\mathrm{abVotes}(p)$, $\mathrm{bcVotes}(p)$, $\mathrm{caVotes}(p) \in \{0,1\}^n$ record each…
- ArrowTheorem.bcVotesGiven a profile $p$, the vote vectors $\mathrm{abVotes}(p)$, $\mathrm{bcVotes}(p)$, $\mathrm{caVotes}(p) \in \{0,1\}^n$ record each…
- ArrowTheorem.caVotesGiven a profile $p$, the vote vectors $\mathrm{abVotes}(p)$, $\mathrm{bcVotes}(p)$, $\mathrm{caVotes}(p) \in \{0,1\}^n$ record each…
- BooleanAnalysis.BooleanFuncA Boolean function of arity $n$ is a function $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \bbr$.
- Used by 2
- ArrowTheorem.arrow_theoremArrow's impossibility theorem. Let $n$ be a natural number and let $f:\{0,1\}^n\to\bbr$ be a social welfare function that aggregates the…
- ArrowTheorem.acyclic_implies_corrFuncAcyclicity forces correlation $-1/3$. Let $f:\{0,1\}^n\to\bbr$ be a Boolean function that is odd, $\pm 1$-valued, and acyclic. Then its…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option maxHeartbeats 800000 in open scoped BigOperators in open BooleanAnalysis in variable {n : ℕ} in /-- A social welfare function `f` is **acyclic** if no profile of transitive voter orderings produces a Condorcet cycle in society's preferences. A Condorcet cycle occurs when f(ab) = f(bc) = f(ca) = 1 (society prefers a to b, b to c, and c to a — a cycle a>b>c>a) or f(ab) = f(bc) = f(ca) = -1 (the reverse cycle). **Source:** [OD14, Ch. 2]. -/ def ArrowTheorem.acyclic (f : BooleanFunc n) : Prop := ∀ p : Profile n, ¬ (f (abVotes p) = 1 ∧ f (bcVotes p) = 1 ∧ f (caVotes p) = 1) ∧ ¬ (f (abVotes p) = -1 ∧ f (bcVotes p) = -1 ∧ f (caVotes p) = -1)