AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Scheme.PerfectlyPrivate

defimported Lean

Perfect privacy for unauthorized coalitions: conditioning on a view does not change the prior on secrets.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {Secret Randomness Party Share : Type*} in
noncomputable def Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Scheme.PerfectlyPrivate (scheme : Scheme Secret Randomness Party Share) : Prop
Defined in
CSLib, `Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Scheme.PerfectlyPrivate`
Lean proof
By Samuel Schlesinger, from github.com/leanprover/cslib at 3951377e5a3f (Copyright (c) 2026 Samuel Schlesinger. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.33.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 4

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {Secret Randomness Party Share : Type*} in
/-- Perfect privacy for unauthorized coalitions: conditioning on a view does not change the prior on secrets. -/
noncomputable def Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Scheme.PerfectlyPrivate (scheme : Scheme Secret Randomness Party Share) : Prop :=
  ∀ (s : Finset Party) (_hs : ¬ scheme.authorized s)
    (secretDist : PMF Secret) (v : s → Share)
    (hv : v ∈ (secretDist.bind (scheme.viewDist s)).support),
      scheme.posteriorSecretDist s secretDist v hv = secretDist
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