EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsAntisymmetric.quadform_zero
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
For any vector z, ∑_{i,j} z_i B_{ij} z_j = 0.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type} [Fintype I] [Nonempty I] [DecidableEq I] in theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsAntisymmetric.quadform_zero {B : I → I → ℝ} (hB : IsAntisymmetric B) (z : I → ℝ) : ∑ i, ∑ j, z i * B i j * z j = 0
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsAntisymmetric.quadform_zero`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsAntisymmetric.quadform_zero← EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsAntisymmetric.quadform_zero (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/Antisymmetric.lean:37): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsAntisymmetricA square matrix is antisymmetric if
B i j = -B j ifor alli, j.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsAntisymmetricA square matrix is antisymmetric if
- Used by 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.antisymmetric_self_pairing_zero
xᵀ B x = 0for any mixed strategyx(whenBis antisymmetric), wherexᵀ B x = ∑ i, xx_i * (∑ j, B_ij * xx_j).
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.antisymmetric_self_pairing_zero
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type} [Fintype I] [Nonempty I] [DecidableEq I] in/-- For any vector `z`, `∑_{i,j} z_i B_{ij} z_j = 0`. -/theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsAntisymmetric.quadform_zero {B : I → I → ℝ} (hB : IsAntisymmetric B) (z : I → ℝ) : ∑ i, ∑ j, z i * B i j * z j = 0 := by -- Strategy: set S = LHS, compute T = ∑_i ∑_j z_j B_ji z_i in two ways. -- (1) T = S by sum_comm + alpha-rename + ring. -- (2) T = -S by antisymmetry B_ji = -B_ij. -- Conclude 2 * S = 0. set S : ℝ := ∑ i, ∑ j, z i * B i j * z j with hS_def have hT_eq_S : (∑ i, ∑ j, z j * B j i * z i) = S := by rw [hS_def, Finset.sum_comm] have hT_eq_negS : (∑ i, ∑ j, z j * B j i * z i) = -S := by have step1 : (∑ i, ∑ j, z j * B j i * z i) = ∑ i, ∑ j, -(z i * B i j * z j) := by refine Finset.sum_congr rfl (fun i _ => Finset.sum_congr rfl (fun j _ => ?_)) rw [hB j i]; ring rw [step1] rw [show (∑ i, ∑ j, -(z i * B i j * z j)) = ∑ i, -(∑ j, z i * B i j * z j) from Finset.sum_congr rfl (fun i _ => Finset.sum_neg_distrib _)] rw [Finset.sum_neg_distrib] linarith [hT_eq_S, hT_eq_negS]