EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium
defimported Lean
Nash equilibrium predicate at the mixed-profile level: σ is a Nash equilibrium of G if no player i can improve by unilaterally deviating to any mixed strategy τ.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators Function in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable {N : Type*} in variable (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) in variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] in variable [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] in variable [∀ i, Inhabited (G.strategy i)] in noncomputable def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) [Fintype N] [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] : MixedS G → Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium← StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Nash.lean:249): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Nash.lean:249 (StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,4 +1,11 @@ -/-- Nash equilibrium predicate at the mixed-profile level: `σ` is a Nash equilibrium of `G` - if no player `i` can improve by unilaterally deviating to any mixed strategy `τ`. -/ -def mixedNashEquilibrium (G : StrategicGame N ℝ) [Fintype N] [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] : +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open BigOperators Function in +set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in +variable {N : Type*} in +variable (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) in +variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] in +variable [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] in +variable [∀ i, Inhabited (G.strategy i)] in +noncomputable def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) [Fintype N] [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] : MixedS G → Prop := - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedSType abbreviation for the product of standard simplices (one per player), used throughout this file. Defined as an
abbrevso Lean… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixedExpected payoff of player
iunder mixed profileσ. Sums over all pure profiles, weighting by the product of each player's probability. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedSType abbreviation for the product of standard simplices (one per player), used throughout this file. Defined as an
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators Function in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable {N : Type*} in variable (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) in variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] in variable [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] in variable [∀ i, Inhabited (G.strategy i)] in /-- Nash equilibrium predicate at the mixed-profile level: `σ` is a Nash equilibrium of `G` if no player `i` can improve by unilaterally deviating to any mixed strategy `τ`. -/ noncomputable def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) [Fintype N] [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] : MixedS G → Prop := fun σ => ∀ i (τ : stdSimplex ℝ (G.strategy i)), evaluate_at_mixed G i (update σ i τ) ≤ evaluate_at_mixed G i σ