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EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium

defimported Lean

Nash equilibrium predicate at the mixed-profile level: σ is a Nash equilibrium of G if no player i can improve by unilaterally deviating to any mixed strategy τ.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BigOperators Function in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
variable {N : Type*} in
variable (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) in
variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] in
variable [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] in
variable [∀ i, Inhabited (G.strategy i)] in
noncomputable def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) [Fintype N] [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] :
    MixedS G → Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
What was changed in EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium
--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Nash.lean:249 (StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium)
+++ as compiled here
@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
-/-- Nash equilibrium predicate at the mixed-profile level: `σ` is a Nash equilibrium of `G`
-    if no player `i` can improve by unilaterally deviating to any mixed strategy `τ`. -/
-def mixedNashEquilibrium (G : StrategicGame N ℝ) [Fintype N] [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] :
+set_option autoImplicit true in
+set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
+open BigOperators Function in
+set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
+variable {N : Type*} in
+variable (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) in
+variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] in
+variable [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] in
+variable [∀ i, Inhabited (G.strategy i)] in
+noncomputable def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) [Fintype N] [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] :
     MixedS G → Prop :=
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 3
  • EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedSType abbreviation for the product of standard simplices (one per player), used throughout this file. Defined as an abbrev so Lean…
  • EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixedExpected payoff of player i under mixed profile σ. Sums over all pure profiles, weighting by the product of each player's probability.
  • EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players N and utilities in U. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BigOperators Function in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
variable {N : Type*} in
variable (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) in
variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] in
variable [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] in
variable [∀ i, Inhabited (G.strategy i)] in
/-- Nash equilibrium predicate at the mixed-profile level: `σ` is a Nash equilibrium of `G` if no player `i` can improve by unilaterally deviating to any mixed strategy `τ`. -/
noncomputable def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixedNashEquilibrium (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) [Fintype N] [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] :
    MixedS G → Prop :=
  fun σ => ∀ i (τ : stdSimplex ℝ (G.strategy i)),
    evaluate_at_mixed G i (update σ i τ) ≤ evaluate_at_mixed G i σ
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