FiniteImperfectGame.actionAt_same_info_label
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If two states are in the same information set, a strategy is queried through the same information-set label at both states. This is the formal constancy-by-indexing property; comparing concrete action values requires an action equivalence from SameActionsOnInfo.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} (G : FiniteImperfectGame N U) in theorem FiniteImperfectGame.actionAt_same_info_label {i : N} (σ : G.PureStrategy i) {s t : G.State} {k : G.InfoSet} (hs : G.info s = some k) (ht : G.info t = some k) (hms : G.mover s = some i) (hmt : G.mover t = some i) : PureStrategy.actionAt G σ hs hms = σ k s hs hms ∧ PureStrategy.actionAt G σ ht hmt = σ k t ht hmt
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `FiniteImperfectGame.actionAt_same_info_label`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.FiniteImperfectGame.actionAt_same_info_label← FiniteImperfectGame.actionAt_same_info_label (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/ImperfectInformation.lean:119): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 3
- FiniteImperfectGameFinite imperfect-information extensive game data.
info s = nonemeans the state is not in a strategic information set, typically because… - FiniteImperfectGame.PureStrategyA pure strategy chooses one abstract action for each player and information set. The action type is indexed by a representative state for…
- FiniteImperfectGame.PureStrategy.actionAtThe action prescribed at a concrete player-controlled state in an information set.
- FiniteImperfectGameFinite imperfect-information extensive game data.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} (G : FiniteImperfectGame N U) in /-- If two states are in the same information set, a strategy is queried through the same information-set label at both states. This is the formal constancy-by-indexing property; comparing concrete action values requires an action equivalence from `SameActionsOnInfo`. -/ theorem FiniteImperfectGame.actionAt_same_info_label {i : N} (σ : G.PureStrategy i) {s t : G.State} {k : G.InfoSet} (hs : G.info s = some k) (ht : G.info t = some k) (hms : G.mover s = some i) (hmt : G.mover t = some i) : PureStrategy.actionAt G σ hs hms = σ k s hs hms ∧ PureStrategy.actionAt G σ ht hmt = σ k t ht hmt := ⟨rfl, rfl⟩