SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEquitable
Equitable (EQ): all agents achieve the same utility from their own bundle. ∀ i j, v_i(A_i) = v_j(A_j). Equitability requires comparable utilities across agents — it is most meaningful when valuations are normalized so every agent assigns total value 1 to all goods combined. Equitability is incomparable with envy-freeness: - EF does not imply EQ: agents may have different utilities from their bundles even with no envy (e.g., agent 0 gets a good worth 10 to them, agent 1 gets a good worth 7 to them; if neither envies the other, EF holds but EQ fails). - EQ does not imply EF: equal utilities do not prevent an agent from preferring the other's bundle (if agent 0 values both bundles at 5, they may still prefer agent 1's bundle by their own measure). For divisible goods (normalized valuations), equitable+EF allocations always exist (Alon 1987, n²−n cuts suffice). For indivisible goods, equitable allocations may not exist. [BCM Ch.12; Proc Ch.13]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEquitable (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEquitable`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEquitable← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEquitable (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/Fairness.lean:149): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsEquitableEquitable: all agents obtain the same utility from their own shares.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in /-- Equitable (EQ): all agents achieve the same utility from their own bundle. `∀ i j, v_i(A_i) = v_j(A_j)`. Equitability requires comparable utilities across agents — it is most meaningful when valuations are normalized so every agent assigns total value 1 to all goods combined. Equitability is incomparable with envy-freeness: - EF does not imply EQ: agents may have different utilities from their bundles even with no envy (e.g., agent 0 gets a good worth 10 to them, agent 1 gets a good worth 7 to them; if neither envies the other, EF holds but EQ fails). - EQ does not imply EF: equal utilities do not prevent an agent from preferring the other's bundle (if agent 0 values both bundles at 5, they may still prefer agent 1's bundle by their own measure). For divisible goods (normalized valuations), equitable+EF allocations always exist (Alon 1987, n²−n cuts suffice). For indivisible goods, equitable allocations may not exist. [BCM Ch.12; Proc Ch.13] -/ abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEquitable (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop := SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsEquitable v.val A