AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEquitable

abbrevimported Lean

Equitable (EQ): all agents achieve the same utility from their own bundle. ∀ i j, v_i(A_i) = v_j(A_j). Equitability requires comparable utilities across agents — it is most meaningful when valuations are normalized so every agent assigns total value 1 to all goods combined. Equitability is incomparable with envy-freeness: - EF does not imply EQ: agents may have different utilities from their bundles even with no envy (e.g., agent 0 gets a good worth 10 to them, agent 1 gets a good worth 7 to them; if neither envies the other, EF holds but EQ fails). - EQ does not imply EF: equal utilities do not prevent an agent from preferring the other's bundle (if agent 0 values both bundles at 5, they may still prefer agent 1's bundle by their own measure). For divisible goods (normalized valuations), equitable+EF allocations always exist (Alon 1987, n²−n cuts suffice). For indivisible goods, equitable allocations may not exist. [BCM Ch.12; Proc Ch.13]

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEquitable (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEquitable`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
/-- Equitable (EQ): all agents achieve the same utility from their own bundle. `∀ i j, v_i(A_i) = v_j(A_j)`. Equitability requires comparable utilities across agents — it is most meaningful when valuations are normalized so every agent assigns total value 1 to all goods combined. Equitability is incomparable with envy-freeness: - EF does not imply EQ: agents may have different utilities from their bundles even with no envy (e.g., agent 0 gets a good worth 10 to them, agent 1 gets a good worth 7 to them; if neither envies the other, EF holds but EQ fails). - EQ does not imply EF: equal utilities do not prevent an agent from preferring the other's bundle (if agent 0 values both bundles at 5, they may still prefer agent 1's bundle by their own measure). For divisible goods (normalized valuations), equitable+EF allocations always exist (Alon 1987, n²−n cuts suffice). For indivisible goods, equitable allocations may not exist. [BCM Ch.12; Proc Ch.13] -/
abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsEquitable (v : Valuation N G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop :=
  SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsEquitable v.val A
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