AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isEFX_of_singleton_bundle

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

If agent i's bundle is a singleton {g}, then agent j is EFX with respect to agent i: removing the sole good from A i leaves ∅, which agent j values at most their own bundle. The hypothesis h_empty_le : v.val j ∅ ≤ v.val j (A j) is satisfied whenever valuations are additive with nonneg weights (AdditiveValuation with 0 ≤ w.weight j g for all g).

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isEFX_of_singleton_bundle [DecidableEq G]
    (v : Valuation (Fin 2) G) (A : Allocation (Fin 2) G)
    (i j : Fin 2) {g : G}
    (hAi : A i = {g})
    (h_empty_le : v.val j ∅ ≤ v.val j (A j)) :
    ∀ h ∈ A i, v.val j (A i \ {h}) ≤ v.val j (A j)
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isEFX_of_singleton_bundle`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 2
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset invariable {N G : Type*} in/-- If agent `i`'s bundle is a singleton `{g}`, then agent `j` is EFX with respect to agent `i`: removing the sole good from `A i` leaves `∅`, which agent `j` values at most their own bundle. The hypothesis `h_empty_le : v.val j ∅ ≤ v.val j (A j)` is satisfied whenever valuations are additive with nonneg weights (`AdditiveValuation` with `0 ≤ w.weight j g` for all `g`). -/lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isEFX_of_singleton_bundle [DecidableEq G]    (v : Valuation (Fin 2) G) (A : Allocation (Fin 2) G)    (i j : Fin 2) {g : G}    (hAi : A i = {g})    (h_empty_le : v.val j ∅ ≤ v.val j (A j)) :    ∀ h ∈ A i, v.val j (A i \ {h}) ≤ v.val j (A j) := by  intro h hh  have heq : h = g := by rwa [hAi, mem_singleton] at hh  have hempty : A i \ {h} = ∅ := by simp [hAi, heq]  rw [hempty]  exact h_empty_le
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it