SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isEFX_of_singleton_bundle
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If agent i's bundle is a singleton {g}, then agent j is EFX with respect to agent i: removing the sole good from A i leaves ∅, which agent j values at most their own bundle. The hypothesis h_empty_le : v.val j ∅ ≤ v.val j (A j) is satisfied whenever valuations are additive with nonneg weights (AdditiveValuation with 0 ≤ w.weight j g for all g).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isEFX_of_singleton_bundle [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation (Fin 2) G) (A : Allocation (Fin 2) G) (i j : Fin 2) {g : G} (hAi : A i = {g}) (h_empty_le : v.val j ∅ ≤ v.val j (A j)) : ∀ h ∈ A i, v.val j (A i \ {h}) ≤ v.val j (A j)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isEFX_of_singleton_bundle`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isEFX_of_singleton_bundle← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isEFX_of_singleton_bundle (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/EFX.lean:90): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.efx_two_agents_two_goodsEFX for 2 agents and 2 goods: the allocation giving one good to each agent is EFX. For any two goods
g₀andg₁, the allocation…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.efx_two_agents_two_goodsEFX for 2 agents and 2 goods: the allocation giving one good to each agent is EFX. For any two goods
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset invariable {N G : Type*} in/-- If agent `i`'s bundle is a singleton `{g}`, then agent `j` is EFX with respect to agent `i`: removing the sole good from `A i` leaves `∅`, which agent `j` values at most their own bundle. The hypothesis `h_empty_le : v.val j ∅ ≤ v.val j (A j)` is satisfied whenever valuations are additive with nonneg weights (`AdditiveValuation` with `0 ≤ w.weight j g` for all `g`). -/lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isEFX_of_singleton_bundle [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation (Fin 2) G) (A : Allocation (Fin 2) G) (i j : Fin 2) {g : G} (hAi : A i = {g}) (h_empty_le : v.val j ∅ ≤ v.val j (A j)) : ∀ h ∈ A i, v.val j (A i \ {h}) ≤ v.val j (A j) := by intro h hh have heq : h = g := by rwa [hAi, mem_singleton] at hh have hempty : A i \ {h} = ∅ := by simp [hAi, heq] rw [hempty] exact h_empty_le