SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc
defimported Lean
EFX existence for 2 agents (general m goods, additive nonneg valuations). For any set of goods and additive nonneg valuation, a complete EFX allocation exists. The proof uses the maximality argument outlined in the module header. The key cases are: - Agent 0 EFX follows trivially from the maximality construction. - Agent 1 EFX follows by contradiction: a swap or move argument improves agent 1's value while preserving agent 0's non-envy, contradicting maximality. The residual case (Case C: the best-good argument for zero-v₁ goods) is handled by the minimization over S_star.card, which rules out keeping the same agent-1 value with a strictly smaller chosen bundle.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in noncomputable def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc [DecidableEq G] (allGoods S : Finset G) : Allocation (Fin 2) G
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/EFX.lean:148): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc_isAllocationSocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc_isAllocation
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in /-- **EFX existence for 2 agents** (general m goods, additive nonneg valuations). For any set of goods and additive nonneg valuation, a complete EFX allocation exists. The proof uses the maximality argument outlined in the module header. The key cases are: - Agent 0 EFX follows trivially from the maximality construction. - Agent 1 EFX follows by contradiction: a swap or move argument improves agent 1's value while preserving agent 0's non-envy, contradicting maximality. The residual case (Case C: the best-good argument for zero-v₁ goods) is handled by the minimization over `S_star.card`, which rules out keeping the same agent-1 value with a strictly smaller chosen bundle. -/ noncomputable def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc [DecidableEq G] (allGoods S : Finset G) : Allocation (Fin 2) G := fun i => if i = 0 then S else allGoods \ S