AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc

defimported Lean

EFX existence for 2 agents (general m goods, additive nonneg valuations). For any set of goods and additive nonneg valuation, a complete EFX allocation exists. The proof uses the maximality argument outlined in the module header. The key cases are: - Agent 0 EFX follows trivially from the maximality construction. - Agent 1 EFX follows by contradiction: a swap or move argument improves agent 1's value while preserving agent 0's non-envy, contradicting maximality. The residual case (Case C: the best-good argument for zero-v₁ goods) is handled by the minimization over S_star.card, which rules out keeping the same agent-1 value with a strictly smaller chosen bundle.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
noncomputable def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc [DecidableEq G] (allGoods S : Finset G) :
    Allocation (Fin 2) G
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
/-- **EFX existence for 2 agents** (general m goods, additive nonneg valuations). For any set of goods and additive nonneg valuation, a complete EFX allocation exists. The proof uses the maximality argument outlined in the module header. The key cases are: - Agent 0 EFX follows trivially from the maximality construction. - Agent 1 EFX follows by contradiction: a swap or move argument improves agent 1's value while preserving agent 0's non-envy, contradicting maximality. The residual case (Case C: the best-good argument for zero-v₁ goods) is handled by the minimization over `S_star.card`, which rules out keeping the same agent-1 value with a strictly smaller chosen bundle. -/
noncomputable def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mkAlloc [DecidableEq G] (allGoods S : Finset G) :
    Allocation (Fin 2) G :=
  fun i => if i = 0 then S else allGoods \ S
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