allocation_is_envy_freeable
def
An allocation is envy-freeable if there are nonnegative payments p such that every agent i weakly prefers its own bundle plus payment to every other bundle plus that agent's payment: v_i(A_i) + p_i ≥ v_i(A_j) + p_j.
Statement
def allocation_is_envy_freeable {N M : Type*} [Fintype M] [DecidableEq N] (v : N → Finset M → ℝ) (A : M → N) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2610.14994 (Best-of-both-worlds fair division via subsidies), Sec. 2 (definition of envy-freeability by subsidies).
- Verified
- 16 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- allocation_bundleFor a complete allocation A of the goods M to the agents N (each good to one agent), the bundle of agent i is the set of goods A assigns…
- Used by 6
- two_agent_scale_free_lottery_of_envy_freeable_rescalingsFor two agents and any scale-free allocation property P, if every positive rescaling c ⊙ v admits an allocation that is simultaneously P…
- allocation_is_envy_freeable_of_envy_freeAn envy-free allocation is envy-freeable (with zero payments).
- exists_submodular_instance_no_ef1_envy_freeable_allocation_with_bobw_lotteryThere is an instance with three agents and four indivisible goods, each agent having a normalized monotone submodular valuation, in which…
- two_agent_ex_ante_ef_lottery_exists_envy_freeable_rescalingFor two agents with arbitrary real valuations over subsets of a finite set of items, if q is an ex-ante envy-free lottery over complete…
- two_agent_converse_theoremFor two agents with arbitrary real valuations over subsets of a finite set of items, if q is an ex-ante envy-free lottery over complete…
- two_agent_envy_freeable_iffFor two agents with arbitrary valuations over bundles of items, an allocation is envy-freeable if and only if the sum of agent 0's net…
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Envy-freeable: some nonnegative subsidy vector makes the bundle–payment pairs envy-free. -/ def allocation_is_envy_freeable {N M : Type*} [Fintype M] [DecidableEq N] (v : N → Finset M → ℝ) (A : M → N) : Prop := ∃ p : N → ℝ, (∀ i, 0 ≤ p i) ∧ ∀ i j, v i (allocation_bundle A j) + p j ≤ v i (allocation_bundle A i) + p i