AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

allocation_is_envy_freeable

def

An allocation is envy-freeable if there are nonnegative payments p such that every agent i weakly prefers its own bundle plus payment to every other bundle plus that agent's payment: v_i(A_i) + p_i ≥ v_i(A_j) + p_j.

Statement

def allocation_is_envy_freeable {N M : Type*} [Fintype M] [DecidableEq N]
    (v : N → Finset M → ℝ) (A : M → N) : Prop
Defined in
arXiv:2610.14994 (Best-of-both-worlds fair division via subsidies), Sec. 2 (definition of envy-freeability by subsidies).
Verified
16 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • allocation_bundleFor a complete allocation A of the goods M to the agents N (each good to one agent), the bundle of agent i is the set of goods A assigns…
Used by 6

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Envy-freeable: some nonnegative subsidy vector makes the bundle–payment pairs envy-free. -/
def allocation_is_envy_freeable {N M : Type*} [Fintype M] [DecidableEq N]
    (v : N → Finset M → ℝ) (A : M → N) : Prop :=
  ∃ p : N → ℝ, (∀ i, 0 ≤ p i) ∧
    ∀ i j, v i (allocation_bundle A j) + p j ≤ v i (allocation_bundle A i) + p i
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