any_price_share
def
The AnyPrice share of an agent with valuation v and entitlement w: the minimum over price vectors p of the most valuable bundle S she can afford, p(S) <= w p(M).
Statement
noncomputable def any_price_share {m : ℕ} (v : Finset (Fin m) → ℝ) (w : ℝ) : ℝ
- Defined in
- Exploring Relations among Fairness Notions in Discrete Fair Division, arXiv:2502.02815 v3, Defs. 5, 7, 8, 11; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-02
- Verified
- 02 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 1
- aps_fair_not_imp_prop1_fairOpen problem 2 of arXiv:2502.02815 has a negative answer: for additive goods with unequal entitlements, an allocation can give every agent…
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- The AnyPrice share (arXiv:2502.02815, Def. 8): `APS = min_p max { v(S) : p(S) ≤ w · p([m]) }` over price vectors `p ∈ ℝ^m`. -/ noncomputable def any_price_share {m : ℕ} (v : Finset (Fin m) → ℝ) (w : ℝ) : ℝ := ⨅ p : Fin m → ℝ, ⨆ S : {S : Finset (Fin m) // ∑ j ∈ S, p j ≤ w * ∑ j, p j}, v S