AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

droop_monroe_score

def

Monroe score of a Droop assignment: the number of voters sent to a non-dummy candidate they approve.

Statement

def droop_monroe_score {n m : ℕ} (A : Fin n → Finset (Fin m)) (π : Fin n → Option (Fin m)) :
    ℕ
Defined in
Justified Representation: From Hare to Droop, arXiv:2508.00811, Def. 16 (Monroe score of a Droop assignment)
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Used by 7
  • droop_monroe_exchangeExchange step for Droop assignments: swapping c₀ ∈ W for c ∉ W approved by all of S (no member of S satisfied) gives a Droop-valid…
  • is_droop_monroe_committeeW is a winning committee of the Droop Monroe rule: some Droop-valid assignment for W scores at least as much as every Droop-valid…
  • droop_monroe_score_leA Droop-valid assignment scores at most n - ⌊n/(k+1)⌋, since the dummy voters are unsatisfied.
  • droop_monroe_violates_droop_pjr_plus_of_not_dvdWithout the assumption that k + 1 divides n, the Droop Monroe rule can output a committee violating Droop-PJR+: with n = 4 voters, k = 2…
  • droop_monroe_tie_violates_droop_ejr_plus_fjrWith ties, the Droop Monroe rule can output a committee violating Droop-EJR+ and Droop-FJR even when k + 1 divides n: n = 3, k = 2,…
  • droop_monroe_satisfies_droop_jrEvery committee W of size k selected by the Droop Monroe rule satisfies Droop-JR: every voter group S of size strictly greater than…
  • droop_monroe_unsatisfied_groupLemma 2 of arXiv:2508.00811: if (k+1) divides n and π is an optimal Droop-valid assignment for W, no group of more than n/(k+1) voters,…

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Monroe score of a Droop assignment: voters sent to a (non-dummy) candidate they approve. -/
def droop_monroe_score {n m : ℕ} (A : Fin n → Finset (Fin m)) (π : Fin n → Option (Fin m)) :
    ℕ :=
  (Finset.univ.filter fun i => ∃ c, π i = some c ∧ c ∈ A i).card
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it