is_bfjr_cohesive
def
(α, β)-BFJR-cohesiveness (arXiv:2505.22513, Def. A.5) in the embedding of a temporal election: for every feasible X, either some Y with |Y| = α giving every member of S satisfaction at least β has X ∪ Y feasible, or |S|/n > α/(|X| + α).
Statement
def is_bfjr_cohesive {n ℓ m : ℕ} (a : Fin n → Fin ℓ → Finset (Fin m)) (S : Finset (Fin n)) (α β : ℕ) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2505.22513, Def. A.5 ((alpha, beta)-BFJR-cohesive groups)
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- temporal_feasibleA set of (candidate, round) pairs is feasible in the general-approval embedding of a temporal election if it uses every round at most once.
- temporal_embed_satSatisfaction of voter i from a set Y of (candidate, round) pairs: the number of pairs (c, r) in Y with c approved by i in round r.
- Used by 2
- temporal_droop_fjr_not_imp_bfjrDroop-FJR does not imply BFJR in temporal voting, even when no voter approves every candidate in a round. Four voters, six rounds, two…
- is_temporal_bfjrBFJR for a temporal outcome o (arXiv:2505.22513, Def. A.5): every (α, β)-BFJR-cohesive group has a member with satisfaction at least β…
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/-- `(α, β)`-BFJR-cohesiveness (arXiv:2505.22513, Def. A.5) in the embedding of a temporal election: for every feasible `X`, either some `Y` with `|Y| = α`, giving every member of `S` satisfaction at least `β`, has `X ∪ Y` feasible, or `|S|/n > α/(|X| + α)`. -/ def is_bfjr_cohesive {n ℓ m : ℕ} (a : Fin n → Fin ℓ → Finset (Fin m)) (S : Finset (Fin n)) (α β : ℕ) : Prop := ∀ X : Finset (Fin m × Fin ℓ), temporal_feasible X → (∃ Y : Finset (Fin m × Fin ℓ), Y.card = α ∧ (∀ i ∈ S, β ≤ temporal_embed_sat a i Y) ∧ temporal_feasible (X ∪ Y)) ∨ α * n < S.card * (X.card + α)