AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible

def

For a direct mechanism (M : DirectMechanism Player Theta Outcome) with {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player], {Theta : Player → Type*}, {Outcome : Type*}, and valuation profile (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ), is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible M v is defined with body := ∀ (i : Player) (θ : ∀ j, Theta j) (θ_i' : Theta i), v i (θ i) (M.allocation (Function.update θ i θ_i')) - M.payment i (Function.update θ i θ_i') ≤ v i (θ i) (M.allocation θ) - M.payment i θ.

Statement

def is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible
    {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player] {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*}
    (M : DirectMechanism Player Theta Outcome)
    (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) : Prop
Defined in
Borgers, Definition 2.1
Verified
01 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • DirectMechanismA direct mechanism with player type Player, type spaces Theta i for each player i : Player, and outcome type Outcome, consists of an…
Used by 3
  • dsic_of_constant_mechanismA constant direct mechanism, which chooses a fixed allocation and charges a fixed payment regardless of reports, is dominant-strategy…
  • revelation_principle_dominant_strategyThe Revelation Principle for dominant-strategy equilibrium: if s is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of mechanism M with respect to…
  • dsic_iff_truthful_dominant_strategyFor any direct mechanism M and valuation profile v, truthful reporting (the identity strategy profile fun _ => id) is a dominant-strategy…

Read back from the Lean

Given a type Player with decidable equality, a type family Theta : Player → Type* of types for each player, an outcome type Outcome, a direct mechanism M (consisting of an allocation function M.allocation : (∀ j, Theta j) → Outcome and a payment function M.payment : Player → (∀ j, Theta j) → ℝ), and a valuation function v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ, is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible M v is the proposition that: For every player i : Player, every type profile θ : ∀ j, Theta j, and every alternative type θ_i' : Theta i for player i: The valuation v i (θ i) of the outcome allocated when player i reports θ_i' (and all other players report according to θ), minus the payment charged to player i under that updated profile, is less than or equal to the valuation v i (θ i) of the outcome allocated when all players report according to θ, minus the payment charged to player i under θ.

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (strategy-proofness) for a direct mechanism. -/
def is_dominant_strategy_incentive_compatible
    {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player] {Theta : Player → Type*} {Outcome : Type*}
    (M : DirectMechanism Player Theta Outcome)
    (v : (i : Player) → Theta i → Outcome → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ (i : Player) (θ : ∀ j, Theta j) (θ_i' : Theta i),
    v i (θ i) (M.allocation (Function.update θ i θ_i')) - M.payment i (Function.update θ i θ_i') ≤
    v i (θ i) (M.allocation θ) - M.payment i θ
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