AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_efx_fair

def

An allocation is EFX-fair to agent i (arXiv:2502.02815, Def. 3, equal entitlements) if, against every other agent j, either i does not envy j, or removing any subset of j's bundle with positive marginal value over i's bundle ends the envy and removing any subset of i's bundle with negative marginal value ends it too.

Statement

def is_efx_fair {m n : ℕ} (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ) (σ : Fin m → Fin n) (i : Fin n) : Prop
Defined in
Exploring Relations among Fairness Notions in Discrete Fair Division, arXiv:2502.02815 v3, Defs. 3, 10; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
Verified
02 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • bundle_ofUnder an allocation that gives each item x to agent s(x), agent i's bundle is the set of items given to i.
Used by 1
  • is_mxs_fairAn allocation is MXS-fair to agent i (minimum EFX share, arXiv:2502.02815, Def. 10) if i's bundle is worth to her at least her bundle in…

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- EFX (arXiv:2502.02815, Def. 3, equal entitlements), judged by agent `i`'s valuation `v i`: against every other agent `j`, either `i` does not envy `j`, or removing any subset `S` of `j`'s bundle with positive marginal value over `i`'s bundle ends the envy, and removing any subset `S` of `i`'s own bundle with negative marginal value ends it too. -/
def is_efx_fair {m n : ℕ} (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ) (σ : Fin m → Fin n) (i : Fin n) : Prop :=
  ∀ j, j ≠ i → v i (bundle_of σ j) ≤ v i (bundle_of σ i) ∨
    ((∀ S, S ⊆ bundle_of σ j → v i (bundle_of σ i) < v i (bundle_of σ i ∪ S) →
        v i (bundle_of σ j \ S) ≤ v i (bundle_of σ i)) ∧
     (∀ S, S ⊆ bundle_of σ i → v i (bundle_of σ i) < v i (bundle_of σ i \ S) →
        v i (bundle_of σ j) ≤ v i (bundle_of σ i \ S)))
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