AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_envy_free_with_subsidy

def

An allocation with nonnegative payments p is envy-free if v_i(A_i) + p_i ≥ v_i(A_j) + p_j for all agents i, j.

Statement

def is_envy_free_with_subsidy {m n : ℕ} (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ)
    (σ : Fin m → Fin n) (p : Fin n → ℝ) : Prop
Defined in
On the Subsidy of Envy-Free Orientations in Graphs, arXiv:2502.13671 v1, Sec. 2; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
Verified
03 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • bundle_ofUnder an allocation that gives each item x to agent s(x), agent i's bundle is the set of items given to i.
Used by 5

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- The allocation `σ` with payments `p ≥ 0` is envy-free: `v i (A j) + p j ≤ v i (A i) + p i` for all agents `i`, `j`. -/
def is_envy_free_with_subsidy {m n : ℕ} (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ)
    (σ : Fin m → Fin n) (p : Fin n → ℝ) : Prop :=
  (∀ i, 0 ≤ p i) ∧ ∀ i j, v i (bundle_of σ j) + p j ≤ v i (bundle_of σ i) + p i
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