is_equal_marginal_lottery
def
A lottery p over complete allocations of m chores to n agents has equal marginals if every chore g is assigned to every agent i with probability exactly 1/n.
Statement
def is_equal_marginal_lottery {m n : ℕ} (p : (Fin m → Fin n) → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2609.35280
- Verified
- 05 Nov 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 8
- two_agent_bivalued_equal_marginal_sharp_mmsFor two agents (n = 2), ratio r with 1 ≤ r and r ≤ 2, and m chores with a cost profile c : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ satisfying…
- three_agent_seven_chores_equal_marginal_sharp_mmsFor three agents, seven chores, any ratio r in [1,2], and any scaled bivalued additive cost profile with common ratio r, there is a…
- uniform_bivalued_obstruction_no_equal_marginal_exact_mmsFor every integer t at least 2 and every real ratio r strictly between 1 + 1/t and 1 + 1/(t-1), the instance with 4t chores where agent 0…
- is_ex_ante_proportional_of_equal_marginalEvery equal-marginal lottery over complete chore allocations is ex-ante proportional for any profile of chore costs.
- equal_weight_allocation_family_lotteryFor at least one agent, if a family of n allocations assigns each chore once to each agent across the n allocations and every family…
- uniform_bivalued_unit_ratio_exact_mmsFor any number of chores m and any two-agent chore cost profile c satisfying is_uniform_bivalued_chores 1 c, there exists a lottery p in…
- two_agent_balanced_symmetric_swap_lotteryIf both bundles of a two-way partition cost at most alpha times the maximin share of each agent, the equal mixture of that allocation and…
- all_agent_bivalued_equal_marginal_divisible_choresFor every n at least two and k at least two, any common ratio r at least one, and any n-agent scaled bivalued additive cost profile on n*k…
Read back from the Lean
For fixed (implicit) natural numbers m and n, and a function p : (Fin m → Fin n) → ℝ, is_equal_marginal_lottery p asserts that: for every g : Fin m and every i : Fin n, the sum over all functions σ : Fin m → Fin n of (if σ(g) = i then p(σ) else 0) is equal to 1 / n (in ℝ).
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- An allocation lottery has equal marginals if every chore is assigned to each agent with probability 1/n. -/ def is_equal_marginal_lottery {m n : ℕ} (p : (Fin m → Fin n) → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ (g : Fin m) (i : Fin n), (∑ σ : Fin m → Fin n, if σ g = i then p σ else 0) = 1 / (n : ℝ)