AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_ex_post_alpha_mms_chores

def

An allocation lottery p over allocations of m chores among n agents is ex-post α-MMS for chore costs c if every allocation σ in the support of p (having p σ > 0) is α-MMS for c.

Statement

def is_ex_post_alpha_mms_chores {m n : ℕ} (α : ℝ) (c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ)
    (p : (Fin m → Fin n) → ℝ) : Prop
Defined in
arXiv:2611.04884, Section 2
Verified
04 Nov 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • is_alpha_mms_choresAn allocation σ of m chores among n agents is α-MMS for cost functions c if each agent i's total cost for her assigned bundle bundle_of σ…
Used by 8

Read back from the Lean

For natural numbers m and n, a real number α, cost/valuation functions c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ, and an allocation weighting function p : (Fin m → Fin n) → ℝ, is_ex_post_alpha_mms_chores α c p asserts that for every item assignment σ : Fin m → Fin n, if p σ > 0, then for every agent i : Fin n, agent i's total cost for items assigned to them under σ is at most α times agent i's chore 1-out-of-n maximin share (which is the infimum over all assignments P : Fin m → Fin n of the supremum over bundles k : Fin n of the total cost to agent i of the items assigned to k under P).

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- An allocation lottery is ex-post α-MMS for chores if every allocation in its support is α-MMS. -/
def is_ex_post_alpha_mms_chores {m n : ℕ} (α : ℝ) (c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ)
    (p : (Fin m → Fin n) → ℝ) : Prop :=
  ∀ σ : Fin m → Fin n, 0 < p σ → is_alpha_mms_chores α c σ
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