is_ex_post_alpha_mms_chores
An allocation lottery p over allocations of m chores among n agents is ex-post α-MMS for chore costs c if every allocation σ in the support of p (having p σ > 0) is α-MMS for c.
Statement
def is_ex_post_alpha_mms_chores {m n : ℕ} (α : ℝ) (c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (p : (Fin m → Fin n) → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2611.04884, Section 2
- Verified
- 04 Nov 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- is_alpha_mms_choresAn allocation σ of m chores among n agents is α-MMS for cost functions c if each agent i's total cost for her assigned bundle bundle_of σ…
- Used by 8
- two_agent_bivalued_equal_marginal_sharp_mmsFor two agents (n = 2), ratio r with 1 ≤ r and r ≤ 2, and m chores with a cost profile c : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ satisfying…
- three_agent_seven_chores_equal_marginal_sharp_mmsFor three agents, seven chores, any ratio r in [1,2], and any scaled bivalued additive cost profile with common ratio r, there is a…
- uniform_bivalued_obstruction_no_equal_marginal_exact_mmsFor every integer t at least 2 and every real ratio r strictly between 1 + 1/t and 1 + 1/(t-1), the instance with 4t chores where agent 0…
- equal_weight_allocation_family_lotteryFor at least one agent, if a family of n allocations assigns each chore once to each agent across the n allocations and every family…
- uniform_bivalued_unit_ratio_exact_mmsFor any number of chores m and any two-agent chore cost profile c satisfying is_uniform_bivalued_chores 1 c, there exists a lottery p in…
- two_agent_balanced_symmetric_swap_lotteryIf both bundles of a two-way partition cost at most alpha times the maximin share of each agent, the equal mixture of that allocation and…
- ex_post_one_mms_chore_lottery_single_agentFor a single agent (n = 1) and any m indivisible chores with nonnegative additive costs c, there exists an allocation lottery that is…
- all_agent_bivalued_equal_marginal_divisible_choresFor every n at least two and k at least two, any common ratio r at least one, and any n-agent scaled bivalued additive cost profile on n*k…
Read back from the Lean
For natural numbers m and n, a real number α, cost/valuation functions c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ, and an allocation weighting function p : (Fin m → Fin n) → ℝ, is_ex_post_alpha_mms_chores α c p asserts that for every item assignment σ : Fin m → Fin n, if p σ > 0, then for every agent i : Fin n, agent i's total cost for items assigned to them under σ is at most α times agent i's chore 1-out-of-n maximin share (which is the infimum over all assignments P : Fin m → Fin n of the supremum over bundles k : Fin n of the total cost to agent i of the items assigned to k under P).
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- An allocation lottery is ex-post α-MMS for chores if every allocation in its support is α-MMS. -/ def is_ex_post_alpha_mms_chores {m n : ℕ} (α : ℝ) (c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (p : (Fin m → Fin n) → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ σ : Fin m → Fin n, 0 < p σ → is_alpha_mms_chores α c σ