is_fractionally_pareto_optimal
An allocation of goods σ is fractionally Pareto optimal for additive valuations u if no fractional assignment x weakly improves every agent's additive utility and strictly improves at least one agent's additive utility.
Statement
def is_fractionally_pareto_optimal {m n : ℕ} (u : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin m → Fin n) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2610.14994, Section 2
- Verified
- 01 Nov 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- goods_utilityThe utility vector of an allocation of goods under additive valuations: agent i's value for her own bundle.
- Used by 6
- op_1004_two_type_efx_fpo_equal_ratioFor any real number a > 1, every two-agent instance on a finite set of goods where each good is valued at a by both agents or at 1 by both…
- is_fractionally_pareto_optimal_scaleMultiplying each agent's additive valuation vector by a positive scale c_i > 0 preserves and reflects fractional Pareto optimality.
- fpo_of_itemwise_weighted_maxIf an allocation σ assigns each item g to an agent maximizing w_i * u_i(g) for positive weights w, then σ is fractionally Pareto optimal…
- is_fractionally_pareto_optimal_zero_goodsWhen there are no goods, every complete allocation is fractionally Pareto optimal.
- op_1004_two_type_efx_fpo_single_typeFor two agents and any finite set of identical goods valued at c > 0 by agent 0 and d > 0 by agent 1, there exists an allocation that is…
- scaled_common_ratio_bivalued_efx_fpo_envyfreeable_zero_goodsWhen m = 0, the empty allocation Fin.elim0 and zero subsidy vector 0 satisfy EFX, envy-freeness with subsidies, and fractional Pareto…
Read back from the Lean
Given natural numbers $m$ and $n$, a utility matrix $u : \text{Fin } n \to \text{Fin } m \to \mathbb{R}$ (where $u(i, g)$ is the utility of good $g$ to agent $i$), and an allocation $\sigma : \text{Fin } m \to \text{Fin } n$ assigning each good to an agent, is_fractionally_pareto_optimal u σ asserts that there does not exist a fractional allocation $x : \text{Fin } n \to \text{Fin } m \to \mathbb{R}$ such that:
1. For every agent $i$ and good $g$, $0 \le x(i, g)$;
2. For every good $g$, $\sum_{i : \text{Fin } n} x(i, g) = 1$;
3. For every agent $i$, the utility under $\sigma$ (the sum of $u(i, g)$ over all goods $g$ assigned to $i$, i.e., $\sigma(g) = i$) is at most the fractional utility $\sum_{g : \text{Fin } m} u(i, g) \cdot x(i, g)$; and
4. For at least one agent $i$, the utility under $\sigma$ is strictly less than the fractional utility $\sum_{g : \text{Fin } m} u(i, g) \cdot x(i, g)$.
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Fractional Pareto optimality for additive goods: no fractional assignment weakly improves all agents and strictly improves at least one. -/ def is_fractionally_pareto_optimal {m n : ℕ} (u : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin m → Fin n) : Prop := ¬ ∃ x : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ, (∀ i g, 0 ≤ x i g) ∧ (∀ g, ∑ i, x i g = 1) ∧ (∀ i, goods_utility u σ i ≤ ∑ g, u i g * x i g) ∧ (∃ i, goods_utility u σ i < ∑ g, u i g * x i g)