is_in_core
def
An allocation x belongs to the core of a cooperative game v on finite player set α if the total payoff equals v(univ) and every coalition S receives at least v(S).
Statement
def is_in_core {α : Type*} [Fintype α] (v : Finset α → ℝ) (x : α → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2611.16207, Section 2
- Verified
- 13 Nov 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 3
- local_no_swap_of_in_coreFor any cooperative game v on a finite type α satisfying v(∅) = 0 and any ordering bijection e : Fin (Fintype.card α) ≃ α, if the marginal…
- noncore_ordering_fractionFor a cooperative game v : Finset α → ℝ on a finite type α with decidable equality, noncore_ordering_fraction v is the fraction of player…
- two_thirds_convex_three_player_noncore_ordering_fraction_ge_two_thirdsThere exists a 2/3-convex cooperative game v on 3 players (Fin 3) satisfying v(∅) = 0 for which the probability that a uniformly random…
Read back from the Lean
Given a finite type α, a function v : Finset α → ℝ, and a function x : α → ℝ, is_in_core v x asserts that:
1. The sum of x i over all i : α equals v Finset.univ, and
2. For every S : Finset α, v S ≤ ∑ i ∈ S, x i.
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- An allocation belongs to the core of a cooperative game if it is efficient and coalitionally rational. -/ def is_in_core {α : Type*} [Fintype α] (v : Finset α → ℝ) (x : α → ℝ) : Prop := (∑ i, x i = v Finset.univ) ∧ ∀ S : Finset α, v S ≤ ∑ i ∈ S, x i