is_pmms_fair_chores
def
Pairwise maximin share (PMMS) for chores: allocation σ is PMMS for agent i if, for every other agent j and every way of splitting X_i ∪ X_j into two parts T and (X_i ∪ X_j) \ T, agent i's cost for her own bundle is at most her cost for the more costly of the two parts. Equivalently c_i(X_i) is at most the minimum over two-way splits of the larger part.
Statement
def is_pmms_fair_chores {m n : ℕ} (c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin m → Fin n) (i : Fin n) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2609.10493, Sec. 2 (pairwise maximin share for chores)
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- additive_valuationThe additive valuation with item values u: a bundle is worth the sum of its items' values.
- bundle_ofUnder an allocation that gives each item x to agent s(x), agent i's bundle is the set of items given to i.
- Used by 2
- pmms3c_verify_soundIf the certificate check accepts w for allocation σ, then σ is not PMMS for agent w mod 3.
- pmms_chores_three_agents_may_not_existPMMS allocations of chores need not exist already for three agents: there are strictly positive additive costs of three agents for nine…
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Pairwise MMS for chores with additive costs `c`: against every other agent `j`, agent `i`'s cost is at most the larger part of every split of `X_i ∪ X_j` in two, in `i`'s own costs. -/ def is_pmms_fair_chores {m n : ℕ} (c : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin m → Fin n) (i : Fin n) : Prop := ∀ j, j ≠ i → ∀ T ⊆ bundle_of σ i ∪ bundle_of σ j, additive_valuation (c i) (bundle_of σ i) ≤ max (additive_valuation (c i) T) (additive_valuation (c i) ((bundle_of σ i ∪ bundle_of σ j) \ T))