AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_pure_best_response_last

def

In an (r+1)-player game with payoff function u : Fin (r + 1) → ((j : Fin (r + 1)) → A j) → ℝ and action types A, pure action b : A (Fin.last r) is a pure best response for player Fin.last r against mixed profile x : (j : Fin r) → stdSimplex ℝ (A j.castSucc) if for every pure action a : A (Fin.last r), the expected payoff to player Fin.last r under Fin.snoc x (stdSimplex.pure a) is at most that under Fin.snoc x (stdSimplex.pure b).

Statement

def is_pure_best_response_last {r : ℕ} {A : Fin (r + 1) → Type}
    [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
    (u : Fin (r + 1) → ((i : Fin (r + 1)) → A i) → ℝ)
    (x : (j : Fin r) → stdSimplex ℝ (A j.castSucc))
    (b : A (Fin.last r)) : Prop
Defined in
arXiv:2611.06076 Lemma 2.1
Verified
05 Nov 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • normal_form_expected_payoffIn an n-player normal-form game with action types A : Fin n → Type, finite action spaces, and payoff function u : Fin n → ((j : Fin n) → A…
  • stdSimplex.purePoint-mass simplex element at i₀.
Used by 1
  • one_player_extension_approx_nashIn an (r+1)-player normal-form game with payoff functions u : Fin (r + 1) → ((j : Fin (r + 1)) → A j) → ℝ taking values in [0, 1]…

Read back from the Lean

Given a natural number r, action types A i for each i : Fin (r + 1) which are finite and have decidable equality, a payoff function u assigning to each player i : Fin (r + 1) and pure action profile a : (i : Fin (r + 1)) → A i a real number u i a, a mixed strategy profile x : (j : Fin r) → stdSimplex ℝ (A j.castSucc) for the first r players, and an action b : A (Fin.last r) for the last player: The declaration defines the proposition that for all actions a : A (Fin.last r), the expected payoff to player Fin.last r under strategy profile Fin.snoc x (stdSimplex.pure a) is less than or equal to the expected payoff to player Fin.last r under strategy profile Fin.snoc x (stdSimplex.pure b). That is, b is a pure best response for player Fin.last r against the mixed strategy profile x of the other players.

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Pure best response for the last player against a profile of the other players. -/
def is_pure_best_response_last {r : ℕ} {A : Fin (r + 1) → Type}
    [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
    (u : Fin (r + 1) → ((i : Fin (r + 1)) → A i) → ℝ)
    (x : (j : Fin r) → stdSimplex ℝ (A j.castSucc))
    (b : A (Fin.last r)) : Prop :=
  ∀ a : A (Fin.last r),
    normal_form_expected_payoff u (Fin.last r) (Fin.snoc x (stdSimplex.pure a)) ≤
      normal_form_expected_payoff u (Fin.last r) (Fin.snoc x (stdSimplex.pure b))
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