AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_stable_matching

def

In a marriage market with agent types M and W, a matching μ : M ≃ W is stable when no man m and woman w form a blocking pair, that is, when for every m and every w it is not the case that m prefers w to μ m and w prefers m to μ.symm w.

Statement

def is_stable_matching {M W : Type*} (market : MarriageMarket M W)
    (μ : M ≃ W) : Prop
Defined in
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962): stable matching; standard textbook definition (matching markets)
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • MarriageMarketA marriage market with types M and W consists of a relation pref_m : M → W → W → Prop representing men's preferences over women, and a…
  • is_blocking_pairIn a marriage market with agent types M and W and a matching μ : M ≃ W, a man m and a woman w form a blocking pair when m strictly prefers…
Used by 8

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- A matching is stable when no pair blocks it. -/
def is_stable_matching {M W : Type*} (market : MarriageMarket M W)
    (μ : M ≃ W) : Prop :=
  ∀ (m : M) (w : W), ¬ is_blocking_pair market μ m w
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