is_three_distant_convex
def
A cooperative game v on a finite set of players is 3-distant convex if v(S) + v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T) + v(S ∩ T) for all coalitions S and T whose symmetric difference has cardinality at least 3.
Statement
def is_three_distant_convex {α : Type*} [DecidableEq α] (v : Finset α → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2611.07572 Def 1
- Verified
- 08 Nov 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 2
- zero_is_three_distant_convexThe zero game, where every coalition has value zero, is 3-distant convex.
- three_distant_convex_excess_marginal_eq_sdiff_singletonLet N be a finite player type with decidable equality, and let v : Finset N → ℝ be a 3-distant convex cooperative game. For any coalition…
Read back from the Lean
For a type α with decidable equality, a function v : Finset α → ℝ satisfies is_three_distant_convex if and only if for all finite subsets S and T of α, if the cardinality of the symmetric difference of S and T is at least 3, then v(S) + v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T) + v(S ∩ T).
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- A cooperative game v on a finite set of players is 3-distant convex if the convexity condition holds for all pairs of coalitions whose symmetric difference has cardinality at least 3. -/ def is_three_distant_convex {α : Type*} [DecidableEq α] (v : Finset α → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ S T : Finset α, 3 ≤ (symmDiff S T).card → v S + v T ≤ v (S ∪ T) + v (S ∩ T)