is_uniform_bivalued_chores_ones
For any number of chores m and any ratio r, the instance where both agents assign cost 1 to every chore is uniform bivalued with ratio r.
Statement
theorem is_uniform_bivalued_chores_ones (m : ℕ) (r : ℝ) : is_uniform_bivalued_chores r (fun (_ : Fin 2) (_ : Fin m) => (1 : ℝ))
- Source
- OP-1697
- Verified
- 15 Nov 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- is_uniform_bivalued_choresA chore cost profile for two agents and m chores is uniform bivalued with ratio r if the first agent assigns cost 1 to every chore and the…
- social_welfare_emptyThe social welfare of the empty allocation is zero.
Read back from the Lean
For every natural number m and every real number r, the constant valuation/cost function assigning 1 to every agent in Fin 2 and every chore in Fin m satisfies is_uniform_bivalued_chores r.
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
The proof, explained
The theorem asserts that the cost profile assigning cost 1 to every chore for both agents is uniform bivalued with respect to any ratio r. By definition, this requires agent 0's cost to be identically 1 and agent 1's cost to always be 1 or r. Both requirements reduce to trivial tautologies (1 = 1 and 1 = 1 ∨ 1 = r) for every chore, which hold automatically.
The constant profile assigning cost 1 to each chore is uniform bivalued with ratio r. automation
Unfolding the definition of `is_uniform_bivalued_chores` requires showing that agent 0 assigns cost 1 to every chore (which reduces to 1 = 1) and agent 1 assigns cost 1 or r to every chore (which reduces to 1 = 1 ∨ 1 = r). Both conditions are immediate propositional tautologies for every chore g, which the simplifier evaluates to True to close the goal.
uses
social_welfare_emptyis_uniform_bivalued_chores r (fun (_ : Fin 2) (_ : Fin m) => (1 : ℝ)) := by first | exact social_welfare_empty | (apply social_welfare_empty <;> assumption) | (apply social_welfare_empty <;> simp_all) | simpa using social_welfare_empty | (simp only [is_uniform_bivalued_chores] at *; first | exact social_welfare_empty | (apply social_welfare_empty <;> assumption) | (apply social_welfare_empty <;> simp_all) | simpa using social_welfare_empty)
social_welfare_empty- The social welfare achieved by assigning the empty set of goods to each agent is 0.
- The proof uses an automated fallback sequence (`first | ...`). Although `social_welfare_empty` is passed syntactically to `simpa`, it is mathematically unused; the goal simplifies to trivial propositional tautologies on its own once `is_uniform_bivalued_chores` is unfolded.
Written by a model (gemini-3.8-flash) from the Lean proof and the goal states Lean reported at each step. Lean verified the proof; this explanation is a reading aid and is not itself machine-checked.
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Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
/-- The constant cost profile assigning cost 1 to every chore for both agents is uniform bivalued for any ratio r. -/theorem is_uniform_bivalued_chores_ones (m : ℕ) (r : ℝ) : is_uniform_bivalued_chores r (fun (_ : Fin 2) (_ : Fin m) => (1 : ℝ)) := by first | exact social_welfare_empty | (apply social_welfare_empty <;> assumption) | (apply social_welfare_empty <;> simp_all) | simpa using social_welfare_empty | (simp only [is_uniform_bivalued_chores] at *; first | exact social_welfare_empty | (apply social_welfare_empty <;> assumption) | (apply social_welfare_empty <;> simp_all) | simpa using social_welfare_empty)