AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_wefx_goods

def

An allocation σ of m goods to n agents with positive entitlements w is weighted EFX (WEFX) if for every pair of distinct agents i and j, and every good g in j's bundle, agent i's additive value for j's bundle without g divided by j's entitlement w_j is at most agent i's value for her own bundle divided by i's entitlement w_i.

Statement

def is_wefx_goods {m n : ℕ} (w : Fin n → ℝ) (u : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin m → Fin n) : Prop
Defined in
arXiv:2305.16081, Def. 3
Verified
09 Nov 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • bundle_ofUnder an allocation that gives each item x to agent s(x), agent i's bundle is the set of items given to i.
  • additive_valuationThe additive valuation with item values u: a bundle is worth the sum of its items' values.
Used by 2

Read back from the Lean

For implicit natural numbers m (number of goods) and n (number of agents), given a weight vector w : Fin n → ℝ, an agent-item utility function u : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ, and an allocation function σ : Fin m → Fin n, the property is_wefx_goods w u σ asserts: For all agents i, j : Fin n such that i ≠ j, and for every item g : Fin m assigned to agent j (i.e., σ g = j), agent i's additive utility for agent j's bundle with item g removed, divided by w j, is less than or equal to agent i's additive utility for their own bundle, divided by w i.

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Weighted EFX (WEFX): for all distinct agents i and j and every good g in j's bundle, v_i(A_j \ {g}) / w_j ≤ v_i(A_i) / w_i. -/
def is_wefx_goods {m n : ℕ} (w : Fin n → ℝ) (u : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin m → Fin n) : Prop :=
  ∀ i j : Fin n, i ≠ j → ∀ g ∈ bundle_of σ j,
    additive_valuation (u i) ((bundle_of σ j).erase g) / w j ≤ additive_valuation (u i) (bundle_of σ i) / w i
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