AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

mnw2_lb_is_mnw

theoremverifiedformalization

For 0 < ε < 1/7, the allocation N = (0, 1, 1) (good 0 to agent 0, goods 1 and 2 to agent 1) has Nash welfare (2/3)(3/7 + ε), the largest among all eight allocations, so it is an MNW allocation.

Statement

theorem mnw2_lb_is_mnw (ε : ℝ) (h0 : 0 < ε) (h1 : ε < 1 / 7) : is_mnw_allocation (mnw2_lb_val ε) ![0, 1, 1]
Formalizes
The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods, arXiv:1905.04910, Theorem 5.4, lower-bound instance (m = 3, utilities (2/3, 1/3, 0) and (4/7 - eps, 1/7 + eps, 2/7), 0 < eps < 1/7)
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 4
  • mnw2_lb_valValuations of two agents over three goods, depending on a parameter ε: agent 0 has values (2/3, 1/3, 0) and agent 1 has values (4/7 − ε,…
  • mnw2_lb_bundleIn the three-good instance, agent i's value for her bundle under σ is the sum of her values of the goods g ∈ {0, 1, 2} with σ(g) = i.
  • is_mnw_allocationAn allocation σ is a maximum Nash welfare (MNW) allocation if no allocation τ has larger Nash welfare. When the maximum Nash welfare is…
  • nash_welfareNash welfare of an allocation σ of m goods to n agents with additive valuations v_i: NW(σ) = ∏_i v_i(X_i), where X_i is the bundle of…
Used by 1
  • mnw_two_agents_price_lower_boundFor every c < 27/23 there are two agents with additive, nonnegative, normalized valuations over three goods and an allocation O such that…

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- In the lower-bound instance, giving good 0 to agent 0 and goods 1, 2 to agent 1 maximizes Nash welfare. -/theorem mnw2_lb_is_mnw (ε : ℝ) (h0 : 0 < ε) (h1 : ε < 1 / 7) : is_mnw_allocation (mnw2_lb_val ε) ![0, 1, 1] := by  intro τ  have h2 : ∀ x : Fin 2, x = 0 ∨ x = 1 := by decide  simp only [nash_welfare, Fin.prod_univ_two, mnw2_lb_bundle]  rcases h2 (τ 0) with a | a <;> rcases h2 (τ 1) with b | b <;> rcases h2 (τ 2) with c | c <;>    simp [a, b, c, mnw2_lb_val] <;> nlinarith
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it