payoffVsPure
defimported Lean
Given a game $G$, a mixed row strategy $p$, and a pure column $j$, the expected payoff against column $j$ is \[ \mathrm{payoffVsPure}(G, p, j) \;=\; \sum_{i} p_i \cdot A_{ij}. \]
Statement
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in set_option autoImplicit false in open Real Finset BigOperators in noncomputable def payoffVsPure {M N : ℕ} (G : ZeroSumGame M N) (p : MixedStrategy M) (j : Fin N) : ℝ
- Defined in
- TCSlib, `payoffVsPure`
- Lean proof
- By Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, from github.com/Shilun-Allan-Li/tcslib at
c8a02591b1e5(Copyright (c) 2026 Karim Abdel Sadek and Mark Bedaywi. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.25.0.payoffVsPure← payoffVsPure (TCSlib/LearningTheory/Minimax/ZeroSumGame.lean:65): verbatim
- Verified
- 07 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- MixedStrategyA mixed strategy over $n$ actions is a record consisting of a weight function $w : \mathrm{Fin}\,n \to \mathbb{R}$ together with…
- ZeroSumGameA finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions is a record consisting of a payoff matrix…
- Used by 13
- hedgeResponseNat_isBestResponseOnline column response is a best response. Let $G$ be a finite zero-sum game with $M \ge 1$ row actions and $N \ge 1$ column actions, let…
- OnlineLearning.finite_minimax_valueMinimax theorem for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, whose…
- minimax_approx_theoremApproximate minimax theorem for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with payoff matrix $A$, having at…
- weak_dualityWeak duality for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M \ge 1$ row actions and $N \ge 1$ column…
- OnlineLearning.finiteLowerValueFor a finite zero-sum game $G$ with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, the lower value is…
- OnlineLearning.finiteLowerValue_bddAboveRow player's guaranteed payoffs are bounded above. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N \ge 1$ column…
- bestColumnGiven a game $G$ and a mixed row strategy $p$,
bestColumnis the pure column $j^* \in \mathrm{Fin}\,N$ that minimises… - bestColumn_specOptimality of the column best response. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N \ge 1$ column actions,…
- OnlineLearning.payoffVsPure_nonnegNonnegativity of the mixed payoff against a pure column. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column…
- payoffVsPure_averageStrategyAverage strategy's payoff against a pure column. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M \ge 1$ row actions and $N$ column…
- hedge_constructionHedge yields an approximate minimax pair. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with $M \ge 2$ row actions and $N \ge 1$ column…
- OnlineLearning.payoffVsPure_le_oneExpected payoff against a pure column is at most one. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game whose payoff matrix $A$ has every entry…
- approx_minimaxApproximate minimax for finite zero-sum games. Let $G$ be a finite two-player zero-sum game with payoff matrix $A$, having $M \ge 2$ row…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in set_option autoImplicit false in open Real Finset BigOperators in /-- The expected payoff to the row player when the row plays the mixed strategy `p` and the column plays the pure action `j`: the sum over rows `i` of `p i · A(i, j)` (in matrix form, `pᵀ A e_j`). [CBL06, §7.1]; [FS99, §2]. -/ noncomputable def payoffVsPure {M N : ℕ} (G : ZeroSumGame M N) (p : MixedStrategy M) (j : Fin N) : ℝ := ∑ i : Fin M, p.weights i * G.payoff i j