AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

persuasion_receiver_ratio_optimal_constant

theoremverifiedoriginal

The optimal constant is 3/2. 3/2 is the least c with R_max(μ) ≤ c R_0(μ) for all priors μ (over all finite coordinate sets).

Statement

open Finset in
theorem persuasion_receiver_ratio_optimal_constant :
    IsLeast {c : ℝ | ∀ (ι : Type) [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ),
      is_bit_prior μ → persuasion_max_receiver_utility μ ≤ c * persuasion_prior_utility μ}
      (3 / 2)
Related work
operator (Claude), 2026-10-03: the optimal constant in the receiver-utility bound of arXiv:2606.22226 v1 (Sec. 5, first open direction: the constant lies between 39/31 and 3/2) is 3/2. The slice prior (2m+1 equally likely states, one coordinate per m-subset) has R_max/R_0 = (3m+1)/(2m+2)
Verified
27 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 5

Read back from the Lean

The theorem asserts that 3 / 2 is the least real number c such that for every finite type ι : Type (with decidable equality) and every prior distribution μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ on bit vectors (i.e., μ is non-negative and sums to 1), the maximum receiver utility achievable under a sender-optimal scheme, persuasion_max_receiver_utility μ, is at most c * persuasion_prior_utility μ. In other words: 1. For every finite type ι, decidable equality on ι, and prior μ on ι → Bool satisfying (∀ x, 0 ≤ μ x) ∧ ∑ x, μ x = 1, we have: persuasion_max_receiver_utility μ ≤ (3 / 2) * persuasion_prior_utility μ. 2. If c : ℝ is any real number such that the inequality holds for all finite types ι (with decidable equality) and all such priors μ, then 3 / 2 ≤ c.

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

open Finset in/-- **The optimal constant is `3/2`.** `3/2` is the least `c` with `R_max(μ) ≤ c R_0(μ)` forall priors `μ` (over all finite coordinate sets). -/theorem persuasion_receiver_ratio_optimal_constant :    IsLeast {c : ℝ | ∀ (ι : Type) [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (μ : (ι → Bool) → ℝ),      is_bit_prior μ → persuasion_max_receiver_utility μ ≤ c * persuasion_prior_utility μ}      (3 / 2) := by  refine ⟨fun ι _ _ μ hμ => persuasion_max_receiver_utility_le μ hμ, fun c hc => ?_⟩  by_contra h  push Not at h  obtain ⟨m, -, hμ, hlt⟩ := persuasion_receiver_ratio_sharp c h  exact absurd (hc _ _ hμ) (not_le.mpr hlt)
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