AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

pure_nash_of_subsingleton_strategy

theoremverifiedoriginal

In a strategic game where every player has a subsingleton strategy set, every strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.

Statement

theorem pure_nash_of_subsingleton_strategy {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player]
    (G : StrategicGame Player) [∀ i, Subsingleton (G.Strategy i)] (s : ∀ i, G.Strategy i) :
    is_pure_nash_equilibrium G s
Related work
machine-posed degenerate case of pure Nash equilibrium (singleton strategy sets); trivial, no novelty claimed
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 2
  • StrategicGameA strategic-form game with player type Player consists of a family of strategy types Strategy i for each player i : Player, and a…
  • is_pure_nash_equilibriumIn a strategic-form game G with player type Player, a strategy profile s : ∀ i, G.Strategy i is a pure Nash equilibrium if for every…

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- In a game where every player has at most one strategy, any strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium. -/theorem pure_nash_of_subsingleton_strategy {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player]    (G : StrategicGame Player) [∀ i, Subsingleton (G.Strategy i)] (s : ∀ i, G.Strategy i) :    is_pure_nash_equilibrium G s := by  intro i s_i'  rw [Subsingleton.elim (Function.update s i s_i') s]
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