pure_nash_of_subsingleton_strategy
theoremverifiedoriginal
In a strategic game where every player has a subsingleton strategy set, every strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Statement
theorem pure_nash_of_subsingleton_strategy {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player] (G : StrategicGame Player) [∀ i, Subsingleton (G.Strategy i)] (s : ∀ i, G.Strategy i) : is_pure_nash_equilibrium G s
- Related work
- machine-posed degenerate case of pure Nash equilibrium (singleton strategy sets); trivial, no novelty claimed
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- StrategicGameA strategic-form game with player type Player consists of a family of strategy types Strategy i for each player i : Player, and a…
- is_pure_nash_equilibriumIn a strategic-form game G with player type Player, a strategy profile s : ∀ i, G.Strategy i is a pure Nash equilibrium if for every…
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
/-- In a game where every player has at most one strategy, any strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium. -/theorem pure_nash_of_subsingleton_strategy {Player : Type*} [DecidableEq Player] (G : StrategicGame Player) [∀ i, Subsingleton (G.Strategy i)] (s : ∀ i, G.Strategy i) : is_pure_nash_equilibrium G s := by intro i s_i' rw [Subsingleton.elim (Function.update s i s_i') s]