AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

spi_searcher_payoff

def

The searcher's expected payoff u_s(T) under static threshold T and the players' signaling schemes.

Statement

open Finset in
noncomputable def spi_searcher_payoff {N K S : ℕ} (x w : Fin N → Fin K → ℝ) (φ : Fin N → Fin K → Fin S → ℝ)
    (T : ℝ) : ℝ
Defined in
Intrinsic Robustness of Prophet Inequality to Strategic Reward Signaling, NeurIPS 2024 (arXiv:2409.18269), Sec. 2-3 (model, Definition 2.4, Proposition 3.1), Remark 4.1 and Sec. 6; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-04, for finite reward supports and finite signal sets
Verified
03 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • spi_accept_valueExpected reward collected from player i on the event that it is reached and accepted.
  • spi_reach_probProbability that the search reaches player i: all earlier players are rejected (independence across players).
Used by 4
  • spx_payoff_midFor 24/5 < T <= 9, every equilibrium of the four-player instance gives the searcher T p1 + (1-p1)(10/3 + (1-p2) 8/5) with p1 =…
  • spx_searcher_payoff_leIn the four-player instance, for every static threshold T, every S >= 2 and every equilibrium, the searcher's expected payoff is at most…
  • strategic_prophet_no_half_robust_static_thresholdNegative answer to the open question of arXiv:2409.18269: in a four-player two-point instance, equilibria exist for every static…
  • spx_searcher_payoff_at_nineWith threshold T = 9, every equilibrium of the four-player instance gives the searcher exactly 721/150.

Lean source view module on GitHub

open Finset in
/-- The searcher's expected payoff `u_s(T)` under the static threshold `T` and the players' signaling schemes `φ`. -/
noncomputable def spi_searcher_payoff {N K S : ℕ} (x w : Fin N → Fin K → ℝ) (φ : Fin N → Fin K → Fin S → ℝ)
    (T : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  ∑ i, spi_reach_prob x w φ T i * spi_accept_value x w φ T i
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