AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

spi_two_point_max_mid

lemmaverified

If E[X] < T <= h, a two-point player's optimal acceptance probability is q(h-l)/(T-l), at posterior mean exactly T.

Statement

lemma spi_two_point_max_mid (h l q T : ℝ) (hT1 : q * h + (1 - q) * l < T) (hT2 : T ≤ h) :
    spi_two_point_max_prob h l q T = q * (h - l) / (T - l) ∧
      spi_two_point_max_value h l q T = T * (q * (h - l) / (T - l))
Source
step towards strategic_prophet_no_half_robust_static_threshold (no static threshold is 1/2-robust, open in Intrinsic Robustness of Prophet Inequality to Strategic Reward Signaling, NeurIPS 2024 (arXiv:2409.18269), Remark 4.1 and Sec. 6)
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 2
  • spi_two_point_max_probProposition 3.1 for a two-point reward (h with probability q, else l): the largest acceptance probability achievable under threshold T (1…
  • spi_two_point_max_valueThe searcher's expected reward from a two-point player using an optimal scheme (E[X] if T <= E[X], T times the pooling probability if E[X]…
Used by 2
  • spx_payoff_midFor 24/5 < T <= 9, every equilibrium of the four-player instance gives the searcher T p1 + (1-p1)(10/3 + (1-p2) 8/5) with p1 =…
  • spx_searcher_payoff_leIn the four-player instance, for every static threshold T, every S >= 2 and every equilibrium, the searcher's expected payoff is at most…

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Between the mean and the high value (`E[X] < T ≤ h`), a two-point player pools: it is accepted with probability `q (h - l) / (T - l)` at posterior mean exactly `T`. -/lemma spi_two_point_max_mid (h l q T : ℝ) (hT1 : q * h + (1 - q) * l < T) (hT2 : T ≤ h) :    spi_two_point_max_prob h l q T = q * (h - l) / (T - l) ∧      spi_two_point_max_value h l q T = T * (q * (h - l) / (T - l)) := by  unfold spi_two_point_max_prob spi_two_point_max_value  rw [if_neg (not_le.mpr hT1), if_neg (not_le.mpr hT1), if_pos hT2, if_pos hT2]  exact ⟨rfl, rfl⟩
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