two_facility_cost
def
cost_i(c) = sum over j in {F_1, F_2} of p_ij * d(x_i, c_j).
Statement
noncomputable def two_facility_cost {ι X : Type*} [MetricSpace X] (x : ι → X) (p : ι → Fin 2 → Bool) (i : ι) (c : Fin 2 → X) : ℝ
- Defined in
- arXiv:2610.18006 (Truthful two-facility location with candidate locations in metric spaces), Sec. 2, individual cost
- Verified
- 18 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 12
- fixed_dictator_social_cost_le_of_doubletonCase 1 of Theorem 4.5: if the facilities are at the two closest candidate locations w_1, w_2 of an agent i approving both, then SC(w) ≤…
- two_facility_social_costSC(c) = sum over agents i of cost_i(c).
- fixed_dictator_social_cost_le_of_one_approvedCase 3 of Theorem 4.5: when only F_k is approved and it is placed at a closest candidate of an approving agent i (the other facility at…
- two_facility_cost_le_max_costFor a finite nonempty set of agents, every agent i incurs individual cost under solution c that is at most the max cost of c.
- fixed_dictator_max_cost_le_of_doubletonIn the two-facility location problem on a general metric space with candidate set C and a finite nonempty set of agents, if an agent i…
- two_facility_max_costGiven a finite and nonempty set of agents ι, a metric space X, agent positions x, approval preferences p, and facility locations c, the…
- two_facility_max_cost_nonnegFor a finite nonempty set of agents, the max cost of any two-facility solution is nonnegative.
- two_facility_cost_nonnegSanity: every individual cost is nonnegative.
- fixed_dictator_social_cost_le_of_singletonsCase 2 of Theorem 4.5: with no agent approving both facilities, if F_1 is at a closest candidate w_1 of an agent i approving F_1 and F_2…
- fixed_dictator_max_cost_le_of_singletonsIn the two-facility location problem on a metric space with a finite nonempty set of agents, if no agent approves both facilities, agent i…
- fixed_dictator_max_cost_le_of_one_approvedIn the two-facility location problem on a general metric space with candidate set C and a finite nonempty set of agents, if no agent…
- IsTwoFacilityStrategyproofIn the two-facility location problem on a metric space X with agent set ι and approval preferences p, a deterministic mechanism M : (ι →…
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Individual cost of agent `i` at position `x i` with approval preferences `p i : Fin 2 → Bool` when facility `j` is placed at `c j`: the total distance to the approved facilities. -/ noncomputable def two_facility_cost {ι X : Type*} [MetricSpace X] (x : ι → X) (p : ι → Fin 2 → Bool) (i : ι) (c : Fin 2 → X) : ℝ := ∑ j, if p i j then dist (x i) (c j) else 0