AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

wvg_wins

abbrev

A coalition wins in the weighted voting game (w; q) with strict quota if its total weight exceeds q.

Statement

abbrev wvg_wins {n : ℕ} (w : Fin n → ℝ) (q : ℝ) (C : Finset (Fin n)) : Prop
Defined in
How Banzhaf Makes a Victor: Curing a Distortion Paradox in Weighted Voting, EC 2026, Secs. 2-3 and 5; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
Verified
03 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Used by 4
  • propensity_banzhaf_measureThe p-propensity Banzhaf power measure: the probability that player i is pivotal when each other player votes yes independently with…
  • bz3_patternThe winning pattern of the 3-player weighted game (w; 1/2) with strict quota.
  • banzhaf_strict_majority_veto_distortion_ge_five_thirdsAt simple majority with strict quota, the Banzhaf index has veto distortion at least 5/3: for target (3/10, 7/10, 0) the weights (1/2,…
  • bz3_props_patternThe winning pattern of a 3-player game with simplex weights and strict quota 1/2 satisfies bz3_props.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- A coalition `C` wins in the weighted voting game `(w; q)` with a strict quota (How Banzhaf Makes a Victor, Sec. 2.1): its total weight exceeds `q`. -/
abbrev wvg_wins {n : ℕ} (w : Fin n → ℝ) (q : ℝ) (C : Finset (Fin n)) : Prop :=
  q < ∑ i ∈ C, w i
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