AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

AGGame.Lipschitz

def

λ-Lipschitz utilities: |u(x) − u(y)| ≤ λ ‖x − y‖₁ for all partitions x, y of the other n − 1 players.

Statement

open Finset in
def AGGame.Lipschitz {n s : ℕ} (G : AGGame n s) (lam : ℚ) : Prop
Defined in
Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games, FOCS 2007 (arXiv:0710.5582), Sections 1-2 and the concluding conjecture that s*lambda is a lower bound for the approximation of pure Nash equilibria; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
Verified
05 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • AGGameAn anonymous game with n players and s strategies (setting of arXiv 0710.5582, "Computing equilibria in anonymous games", Section 2): the…
Used by 6
  • ag_two_exactExact answer for two strategies. For anonymous games with s = 2 strategies the best possible pure approximation is exactly 2λ = sλ: every…
  • agMP_lipschitzMatching pennies, as an anonymous game, is 1/2-Lipschitz in the l1 norm on count vectors.
  • ag_two_upperUpper bound for two strategies. Every λ-Lipschitz anonymous game with two strategies (any number of players) has a 2λ-approximate pure…
  • agCyc_lipschitzThe cyclic game is 1/8-Lipschitz (for at least two strategies).
  • ag_four_lowerFour strategies: the lower bound sλ is attained. The 5-player, 4-strategy cyclic game is normalised and λ = 1/8-Lipschitz, yet has no pure…
  • ag_three_lowerThree strategies: the lower bound exceeds sλ. The 5-player, 3-strategy cyclic game is normalised and λ = 1/8-Lipschitz, yet has no pure…

Lean source view module on GitHub

open Finset in
/-- `λ`-Lipschitz utilities: `|u(x) − u(y)| ≤ λ ‖x − y‖₁` for all partitions `x, y` of the other `n − 1` players. -/
def AGGame.Lipschitz {n s : ℕ} (G : AGGame n s) (lam : ℚ) : Prop :=
  ∀ p i (x y : Fin s → ℕ), ∑ j, x j = n - 1 → ∑ j, y j = n - 1 →
    |G.u p i x - G.u p i y| ≤ lam * ∑ j, |(x j : ℚ) - (y j : ℚ)|
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