AGGame.Normalized
def
Payoffs lie in [0, 1] (the normalisation of arXiv 0710.5582) on all partitions of the other n − 1 players.
Statement
open Finset in def AGGame.Normalized {n s : ℕ} (G : AGGame n s) : Prop
- Defined in
- Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games, FOCS 2007 (arXiv:0710.5582), Sections 1-2 and the concluding conjecture that s*lambda is a lower bound for the approximation of pure Nash equilibria; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
- Verified
- 05 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- AGGameAn anonymous game with n players and s strategies (setting of arXiv 0710.5582, "Computing equilibria in anonymous games", Section 2): the…
- Used by 5
- ag_two_exactExact answer for two strategies. For anonymous games with s = 2 strategies the best possible pure approximation is exactly 2λ = sλ: every…
- agCyc_normalizedThe cyclic game with n = 5 players has payoffs in [0, 1].
- agMP_normalizedMatching pennies, written as a 2-player 2-strategy anonymous game, has payoffs in [0,1].
- ag_four_lowerFour strategies: the lower bound sλ is attained. The 5-player, 4-strategy cyclic game is normalised and λ = 1/8-Lipschitz, yet has no pure…
- ag_three_lowerThree strategies: the lower bound exceeds sλ. The 5-player, 3-strategy cyclic game is normalised and λ = 1/8-Lipschitz, yet has no pure…
Lean source view module on GitHub
open Finset in /-- Payoffs lie in `[0, 1]` (the normalisation of arXiv 0710.5582) on all partitions of the other `n − 1` players. -/ def AGGame.Normalized {n s : ℕ} (G : AGGame n s) : Prop := ∀ p i (y : Fin s → ℕ), ∑ j, y j = n - 1 → 0 ≤ G.u p i y ∧ G.u p i y ≤ 1