AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

AGGame.PureNE

def

The pure profile σ is an ε-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.

Statement

def AGGame.PureNE {n s : ℕ} (G : AGGame n s) (ε : ℚ) (σ : Fin n → Fin s) : Prop
Defined in
Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games, FOCS 2007 (arXiv:0710.5582), Sections 1-2 and the concluding conjecture that s*lambda is a lower bound for the approximation of pure Nash equilibria; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
Verified
05 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • AGGameAn anonymous game with n players and s strategies (setting of arXiv 0710.5582, "Computing equilibria in anonymous games", Section 2): the…
  • agCntNumber of players other than p using strategy j in the pure profile σ.
Used by 5
  • ag_two_exactExact answer for two strategies. For anonymous games with s = 2 strategies the best possible pure approximation is exactly 2λ = sλ: every…
  • ag_two_upperUpper bound for two strategies. Every λ-Lipschitz anonymous game with two strategies (any number of players) has a 2λ-approximate pure…
  • agMP_no_pureNEIn matching pennies every pure profile leaves a player with regret 1 = 2λ.
  • ag_four_lowerFour strategies: the lower bound sλ is attained. The 5-player, 4-strategy cyclic game is normalised and λ = 1/8-Lipschitz, yet has no pure…
  • ag_three_lowerThree strategies: the lower bound exceeds sλ. The 5-player, 3-strategy cyclic game is normalised and λ = 1/8-Lipschitz, yet has no pure…

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/-- The pure profile `σ` is an `ε`-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. -/
def AGGame.PureNE {n s : ℕ} (G : AGGame n s) (ε : ℚ) (σ : Fin n → Fin s) : Prop :=
  ∀ p : Fin n, ∀ j : Fin s, G.u p j (agCnt σ p) ≤ G.u p (σ p) (agCnt σ p) + ε
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