agMP_no_pureNE
theoremverified
In matching pennies every pure profile leaves a player with regret 1 = 2λ.
Statement
theorem agMP_no_pureNE (ε : ℚ) (hε : ε < 2 * (1 / 2)) (σ : Fin 2 → Fin 2) :
¬ agMP.PureNE ε σ- Source
- step towards ag_two_exact / ag_three_lower / ag_four_lower (Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games, FOCS 2007 (arXiv:0710.5582), concluding conjecture that s*lambda is a lower bound)
- Verified
- 06 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- agCntNumber of players other than p using strategy j in the pure profile σ.
- AGGame.PureNEThe pure profile σ is an ε-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
- agMPMatching pennies as a 2-player, 2-strategy anonymous game: player 0 wants to match the other player, player 1 wants to mismatch.
- agMPvInteger form of the matching-pennies payoffs.
- agMP_u_eqThe rational payoff of matching pennies equals its integer payoff table agMPv.
- agMP_checkFinite check: in matching pennies, every pure profile ![a, b] leaves some player with regret at least 1.
- Used by 1
- ag_two_exactExact answer for two strategies. For anonymous games with s = 2 strategies the best possible pure approximation is exactly 2λ = sλ: every…
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
/-- In matching pennies every pure profile leaves a player with regret `1 = 2λ`. -/theorem agMP_no_pureNE (ε : ℚ) (hε : ε < 2 * (1 / 2)) (σ : Fin 2 → Fin 2) : ¬ agMP.PureNE ε σ := by intro h have hσ : σ = ![σ 0, σ 1] := by funext q; fin_cases q <;> rfl obtain ⟨p, j, hpj⟩ := agMP_check (σ 0) (σ 1) rw [← hσ] at hpj have := h p j rw [agMP_u_eq, agMP_u_eq] at this have hq : ((agMPv p (σ p) (agCnt σ p) + 1 : ℕ) : ℚ) ≤ (agMPv p j (agCnt σ p) : ℚ) := by exact_mod_cast hpj push_cast at hq linarith