BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment
defimported Lean
Auctions over the same Bayesian selling environment.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in def BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment← BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:215): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 7
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- OpponentTypeProfileOpponent type profiles for real-valued auction types.
- ContinuousTypeProfileAgent-specific continuous private-value data.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 12
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment.opponentPrior_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment.opponentPrior_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBounded
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment.prior_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment.prior_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueComparableFeasible candidates with revenue equal to virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueUpperBoundedFeasible candidates with revenue bounded by virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleICIRIntegrableFeasible IC/IR candidates with integrable virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment.typeData_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment.typeData_eq
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Auctions over the same Bayesian selling environment. -/ def BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasSameSellingEnvironment (A B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop := B.prior = A.prior ∧ B.opponentPrior = A.opponentPrior ∧ B.typeData = A.typeData