AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

BayesianSingleItemAuction

structureimported Lean

A direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function Q : I → ℝ, where Q i is agent i's probability of receiving the item under the reported type profile. This matches the allocation/payment shape of SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ. The mechanism is direct: the message space equals the type space, which is taken to be ℝ for each agent, and payments are real-valued. Continuous-type data are stored separately in typeData, while the Bayesian prior is recorded by extra fields.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open MeasureTheory in
structure BayesianSingleItemAuction (I : Type*)
    extends SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ
Defined in
EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 4
  • SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent i has a single private type θ_i : R (their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent…
  • OpponentTypeProfileOpponent type profiles for real-valued auction types.
  • ContinuousTypeProfileAgent-specific continuous private-value data.
  • MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. - I — agents - T — report/type space of each agent - A — allocation space - P — payment space…
Used by 284

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open MeasureTheory in
/-- A direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function `Q : I → ℝ`, where `Q i` is agent `i`'s probability of receiving the item under the reported type profile. This matches the allocation/payment shape of `SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ`. The mechanism is direct: the message space equals the type space, which is taken to be `ℝ` for each agent, and payments are real-valued. Continuous-type data are stored separately in `typeData`, while the Bayesian prior is recorded by extra fields. -/
structure BayesianSingleItemAuction (I : Type*)
    extends SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ where
  /-- Common prior probability measure over true type profiles. -/
  prior : MeasureTheory.Measure (∀ _ : I, ℝ)
  /-- The prior is a probability measure. -/
  prob_prior : MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure prior
  /-- Opponent-type prior `μᵢ` used for interim expectations conditional on a
  fixed report by agent `i`. -/
  opponentPrior : (i : I) → MeasureTheory.Measure (OpponentTypeProfile I i)
  /-- Each opponent-type prior is a probability measure. -/
  prob_opponentPrior :
    ∀ i : I, MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure (opponentPrior i)
  /-- Continuous private-value support and CDF data for each agent. -/
  typeData : ContinuousTypeProfile I

-- Intentionally global so integration lemmas can recover the auction prior
-- from the auction term without repeated local instance setup.

attribute [instance] BayesianSingleItemAuction.prob_prior
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