BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenue
defimported Lean
Ex-ante seller revenue.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenue [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenue`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenue← BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenue (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:176): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.sellerRevenueSeller revenue at a report profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Ex-ante seller revenue. -/ noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenue [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : ℝ := ∫ t, A.sellerRevenue t ∂A.prior