CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesEfficiency
defimported Lean
A solution concept φ satisfies efficiency if payoffs sum to v(N). [MSZ 18.2]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in def CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesEfficiency (φ : CoalitionalGame N ℝ → N → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesEfficiency`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesEfficiency← CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesEfficiency (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/ShapleyValue.lean:63): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with…
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in /-- A solution concept `φ` satisfies efficiency if payoffs sum to `v(N)`. [MSZ 18.2] -/ def CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesEfficiency (φ : CoalitionalGame N ℝ → N → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ, ∑ i : N, φ G i = G.v Finset.univ