AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

CoalitionalGame

structureimported Lean

A coalitional game with transferable utility. N is the player type; U is the utility type. v assigns a worth to each coalition, with the empty coalition worth zero. [MSZ 16.1] No finiteness or concrete number-system assumptions are baked in. Specialize U to ℝ only where real arithmetic is genuinely required.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
structure CoalitionalGame (N : Type*) (U : Type*) [DecidableEq N] [AddZeroClass U]
Defined in
EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Used by 24

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
/-- A coalitional game with transferable utility. `N` is the player type; `U` is the utility type. `v` assigns a worth to each coalition, with the empty coalition worth zero. [MSZ 16.1] No finiteness or concrete number-system assumptions are baked in. Specialize `U` to `ℝ` only where real arithmetic is genuinely required. -/
structure CoalitionalGame (N : Type*) (U : Type*) [DecidableEq N] [AddZeroClass U] where
  /-- The characteristic function: worth of each coalition. -/
  v : Finset N → U
  /-- The empty coalition is worth zero. -/
  empty_zero : v ∅ = 0
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