CoalitionalGame
structureimported Lean
A coalitional game with transferable utility. N is the player type; U is the utility type. v assigns a worth to each coalition, with the empty coalition worth zero. [MSZ 16.1] No finiteness or concrete number-system assumptions are baked in. Specialize U to ℝ only where real arithmetic is genuinely required.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in structure CoalitionalGame (N : Type*) (U : Type*) [DecidableEq N] [AddZeroClass U]
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame← CoalitionalGame (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/Basic.lean:48): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 24
- CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly
v(N). [MSZ 16.1] Requires[Fintype N]and[AddCommMonoid U]. - CoalitionalGame.IsConvexA game is convex if it satisfies the supermodularity condition. [MSZ 17.51] Requires
[LE U](addition comes from[AddZeroClass U]). - CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonicA game is monotonic if larger coalitions are worth at least as much. [MSZ 16.10] Requires
[LE U]. - CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesAdditivityA solution concept satisfies additivity. [MSZ 18.8]
- CoalitionalGame.IsNullPlayerA player is a null player if they add nothing to any coalition. [MSZ 18.6]
- CoalitionalGame.shapleyValueThe Shapley value of player
i. [MSZ 18.14, 18.17]φᵢ(v) = ∑_{S ⊆ N{i}} |S|!(|N|-|S|-1)!/|N|! · (v(S∪{i}) - v(S)) - CoalitionalGame.marginalContribThe marginal contribution of player
ito coalitionS(wherei ∉ S). - CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesNullPlayerA solution concept satisfies the null player property. [MSZ 18.7]
- CoalitionalGame.IsSuperadditiveA game is superadditive if the worth of the union of disjoint coalitions is at least the sum of their worths. [MSZ 16.8] Requires
[LE U]… - CoalitionalGame.IsConvex.isSuperadditiveConvexity implies superadditivity. The
[LE U]constraint is all that's needed beyond the section's[AddZeroClass U]. - CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesSymmetryA solution concept satisfies symmetry. [MSZ 18.4]
- CoalitionalGame.PayoffVectorA payoff vector: an assignment of payoffs to players.
- CoalitionalGame.IsBalancedA collection of coalitions is balanced if there exist positive weights summing to the characteristic vector of
N. [MSZ 17.11] - CoalitionalGame.IsSimpleA game is simple if every coalition's worth is 0 or 1, and the grand coalition's worth is 1. [MSZ 16.2] Requires
[Fintype N]and… - CoalitionalGame.IsImputationAn imputation is an efficient and individually rational payoff vector. [MSZ 17.1]
- CoalitionalGame.IsIndividuallyRationalA payoff vector is individually rational if each player gets at least their singleton worth. Requires
[LE U]. - CoalitionalGame.AreSymmetricTwo players are symmetric if swapping them doesn't change any coalition's worth.
- CoalitionalGame.IsAdditiveA game is additive if
v(S) = ∑_{i ∈ S} v({i}). [MSZ 17.41] Requires[AddCommMonoid U]. - CoalitionalGame.IsWinningA coalition is winning in a simple game if its worth is 1. Requires
[One U]. - CoalitionalGame.core_subset_imputationsEvery element of the core is an imputation.
- CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesEfficiencyA solution concept
φsatisfies efficiency if payoffs sum tov(N). [MSZ 18.2] - CoalitionalGame.CoreThe core of a coalitional game: payoff vectors where no coalition can improve upon its allocation. [MSZ 17.2] An element
xof the core… - CoalitionalGame.IsBalancedGameA game is balanced if every balanced collection satisfies the superadditivity-like condition. [MSZ 17.14 premise]
- CoalitionalGame.coalitionPayoffThe total payoff of a coalition under a payoff vector. Requires
[AddCommMonoid U]for the finite sum.
- CoalitionalGame.IsEfficientA payoff vector is efficient if it distributes exactly
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in /-- A coalitional game with transferable utility. `N` is the player type; `U` is the utility type. `v` assigns a worth to each coalition, with the empty coalition worth zero. [MSZ 16.1] No finiteness or concrete number-system assumptions are baked in. Specialize `U` to `ℝ` only where real arithmetic is genuinely required. -/ structure CoalitionalGame (N : Type*) (U : Type*) [DecidableEq N] [AddZeroClass U] where /-- The characteristic function: worth of each coalition. -/ v : Finset N → U /-- The empty coalition is worth zero. -/ empty_zero : v ∅ = 0