CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesNullPlayer
defimported Lean
A solution concept satisfies the null player property. [MSZ 18.7]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in def CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesNullPlayer (φ : CoalitionalGame N ℝ → N → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesNullPlayer`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesNullPlayer← CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesNullPlayer (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/ShapleyValue.lean:71): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- CoalitionalGame.IsNullPlayerA player is a null player if they add nothing to any coalition. [MSZ 18.6]
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in /-- A solution concept satisfies the null player property. [MSZ 18.7] -/ def CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesNullPlayer (φ : CoalitionalGame N ℝ → N → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) (i : N), G.IsNullPlayer i → φ G i = 0