Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.Params
structureimported Lean
Public parameters for a finite Shamir secret-sharing instance. The threshold is bundled with the evaluation points so the API can enforce the standard non-vacuous threshold < number of parties side condition.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {F Party : Type*} [Field F] [Fintype Party] in structure Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.Params (F : Type*) [Zero F] (Party : Type*) [Fintype Party]
- Defined in
- CSLib, `Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.Params`
- Lean proof
- By Samuel Schlesinger, from github.com/leanprover/cslib at
3951377e5a3f(Copyright (c) 2026 Samuel Schlesinger. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.33.0.Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.Params← Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.Params (Cslib/Crypto/Protocols/SecretSharing/Shamir.lean:71): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 22
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.authorized_univBecause
params.threshold < |Party|, the full party set can always reconstruct the secret. - Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.privacyCorrectionPolynomial_evalCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.privacyCorrectionPolynomial_eval
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.schemeWithShamir's scheme built from a privacy-compatible tail sampler.
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.schemeWith_authorized_iffCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.schemeWith_authorized_iff
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.authorizedA coalition is authorized exactly when it contains at least
params.threshold + 1parties. - Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.schemeWith_share_eqCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.schemeWith_share_eq
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.tailPolynomial_privacyCorrectionCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.tailPolynomial_privacyCorrection
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.privacyCorrectionPolynomial_degree_ltCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.privacyCorrectionPolynomial_degree_lt
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.uniformTailSamplerUniform tail coefficients form the canonical privacy-compatible sampler.
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_indist_of_tailSamplerTranslation-invariant Shamir tail samplers induce secret-independent views for unauthorized coalitions.
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.RandomnessThe random coefficients of the degree-
threshold - 1tail polynomial. - Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.points_injOn_subtypeCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.points_injOn_subtype
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.shareThe Shamir share value sent to one party.
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_eq_view_add_privacyCorrectionCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_eq_view_add_privacyCorrection
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.coeffTranslateCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.coeffTranslate
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.scheme_authorized_iffCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.scheme_authorized_iff
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.schemeThe canonical finite-field Shamir scheme with uniformly sampled tail coefficients.
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.reconstruct_view_eq_secretAny authorized coalition reconstructs the secret from the shares it sees.
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.privacyCorrectionCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.privacyCorrection
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.privacyCorrectionPolynomialCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.privacyCorrectionPolynomial
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.reconstructReconstruct the secret from one coalition's Shamir shares.
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.TailSamplerA sampler on Shamir tail coefficients is privacy-compatible when its distribution is invariant under translation by any coefficient…
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.authorized_univBecause
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {F Party : Type*} [Field F] [Fintype Party] in /-- Public parameters for a finite Shamir secret-sharing instance. The threshold is bundled with the evaluation points so the API can enforce the standard non-vacuous `threshold < number of parties` side condition. -/ structure Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.Params (F : Type*) [Zero F] (Party : Type*) [Fintype Party] where /-- A coalition of size `threshold + 1` is the first authorized size. -/ threshold : ℕ /-- Standard Shamir sharing requires `threshold < number of parties`. -/ threshold_lt_card : threshold < Fintype.card Party /-- The public evaluation point assigned to each party. -/ point : Party → F /-- Distinct parties receive distinct evaluation points. -/ point_injective : Function.Injective point /-- Standard Shamir sharing forbids the point `0`, which would reveal the secret directly. -/ point_nonzero : ∀ i : Party, point i ≠ 0