Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_indist_of_tailSampler
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Translation-invariant Shamir tail samplers induce secret-independent views for unauthorized coalitions.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {F Party : Type*} [Field F] [Fintype Party] in theorem Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_indist_of_tailSampler (params : Params F Party) (sampler : TailSampler params) : ∀ (s : Finset Party), ¬ authorized params s → ∀ secret₀ secret₁ : F, viewDistOf sampler.gen (share params) s secret₀ = viewDistOf sampler.gen (share params) s secret₁
- Formalizes
- CSLib, `Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_indist_of_tailSampler`
- Lean proof
- By Samuel Schlesinger, from github.com/leanprover/cslib at
3951377e5a3f(Copyright (c) 2026 Samuel Schlesinger. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.33.0.Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_indist_of_tailSampler← Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_indist_of_tailSampler (Cslib/Crypto/Protocols/SecretSharing/Shamir.lean:216): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 11
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.Polynomial.tailPolynomial_coeffCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.Polynomial.tailPolynomial_coeff
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.viewDistOfThe view distribution induced by raw sharing data.
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.authorizedA coalition is authorized exactly when it contains at least
params.threshold + 1parties. - Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.RandomnessThe random coefficients of the degree-
threshold - 1tail polynomial. - Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.ParamsPublic parameters for a finite Shamir secret-sharing instance. The threshold is bundled with the evaluation points so the API can enforce…
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.shareThe Shamir share value sent to one party.
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_eq_view_add_privacyCorrectionCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_eq_view_add_privacyCorrection
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Scheme.view_applyCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Scheme.view_apply
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.Polynomial.sharingPolynomial_evalCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.Polynomial.sharingPolynomial_eval
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.privacyCorrectionCslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.privacyCorrection
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.TailSamplerA sampler on Shamir tail coefficients is privacy-compatible when its distribution is invariant under translation by any coefficient…
- Used by 1
- Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.schemeWithShamir's scheme built from a privacy-compatible tail sampler.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {F Party : Type*} [Field F] [Fintype Party] in/-- Translation-invariant Shamir tail samplers induce secret-independent views for unauthorized coalitions. -/theorem Cslib.Crypto.Protocols.SecretSharing.Shamir.view_indist_of_tailSampler (params : Params F Party) (sampler : TailSampler params) : ∀ (s : Finset Party), ¬ authorized params s → ∀ secret₀ secret₁ : F, viewDistOf sampler.gen (share params) s secret₀ = viewDistOf sampler.gen (share params) s secret₁ := by intro s hs secret₀ secret₁ have hcard : s.card ≤ params.threshold := by have hs' : ¬ params.threshold + 1 ≤ s.card := by simpa [authorized] using hs exact Nat.lt_succ_iff.mp (Nat.not_le.mp hs') unfold viewDistOf calc PMF.map (fun coeffs : Randomness params => (fun i : s => share params coeffs secret₀ i : s → F)) sampler.gen = PMF.map (fun coeffs : Randomness params => (fun i : s => share params (coeffs + privacyCorrection (F := F) params s hcard secret₀ secret₁) secret₁ i : s → F)) sampler.gen := by congr 1 funext coeffs exact view_eq_view_add_privacyCorrection (F := F) params s hcard secret₀ secret₁ coeffs _ = PMF.map (fun coeffs : Randomness params => (fun i : s => share params coeffs secret₁ i : s → F)) (PMF.map (fun coeffs => coeffs + privacyCorrection (F := F) params s hcard secret₀ secret₁) sampler.gen) := by rw [PMF.map_comp] rfl _ = PMF.map (fun coeffs : Randomness params => (fun i : s => share params coeffs secret₁ i : s → F)) sampler.gen := by rw [sampler.map_add_eq_self]