GameTree.value_Node_eq_some_child_value
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The value at a node is itself the value of some child (the argmax). Specifically, argMaxOn ... ∈ value h :: valueList t, so it equals value c for some c ∈ h :: t.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] [DecidableLE U] in theorem GameTree.value_Node_eq_some_child_value (m : N) (h : GameTree N U) (t : List (GameTree N U)) : ∃ c ∈ h :: t, value (Node m h t) = value c
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.value_Node_eq_some_child_value`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.value_Node_eq_some_child_value← GameTree.value_Node_eq_some_child_value (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/BackwardInduction.lean:106): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Quot.soundpropext- Built on 10
- GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- GameTree.valueGameTree.value
- GameTree.mem_valueList_iffMembership in
valueListvia membership in the source list. - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - List.argMaxOnA chosen maximizer of
fon the non-empty listhead :: tail, computed by a left fold that keeps the running maximizer (ties keep… - List.argMaxOn_memThe chosen maximizer is a member of the list.
- Used by 4
- GameTree.value₀_Node_eq_some_childAt any decision node, the backward-induction
value₀is realized by one of the node's children. - GameTree.value_zero_sumBackward induction preserves the zero-sum invariant: if every terminal payoff vector is zero-sum, then the selected backward-induction…
- GameTree.optStrategyThe canonical backward-induction strategy: at each node, pick a child whose backward-induction value equals the node's value (i.e., a…
- GameTree.value_optStrategy_eqAt a node, the
optStrategypicks a child whose value equals the node's value.
- GameTree.value₀_Node_eq_some_childAt any decision node, the backward-induction
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] [DecidableLE U] in/-- The value at a node is itself the value of some child (the argmax). Specifically, `argMaxOn ... ∈ value h :: valueList t`, so it equals `value c` for some `c ∈ h :: t`. -/theorem GameTree.value_Node_eq_some_child_value (m : N) (h : GameTree N U) (t : List (GameTree N U)) : ∃ c ∈ h :: t, value (Node m h t) = value c := by rw [value_Node] have hmem := List.argMaxOn_mem (fun v => v m) (value h) (valueList t) rcases List.mem_cons.mp hmem with heq | hmem' · exact ⟨h, List.mem_cons_self, heq⟩ · rw [mem_valueList_iff] at hmem' obtain ⟨c, hc_mem, hc_eq⟩ := hmem' refine ⟨c, List.mem_cons.mpr (Or.inr hc_mem), ?_⟩ exact hc_eq.symm