IsBestResponse
defimported Lean
Player i is playing a best response to profile σ in game G if no unilateral deviation to any strategy s' yields a higher payoff.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in def IsBestResponse (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `IsBestResponse`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.IsBestResponse← IsBestResponse (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/BestResponse.lean:24): adapted
What was changed in
IsBestResponse--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/BestResponse.lean:24 (IsBestResponse) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ -/-- Player `i` is playing a best response to profile `σ` in game `G` if no unilateral - deviation to any strategy `s'` yields a higher payoff. -/ -def IsBestResponse (G : StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) : Prop := - ∀ s' : G.strategy i, G.payoff (deviate σ i s') i ≤ G.payoff σ i +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +def IsBestResponse (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) : Prop := + ∀ s' : G.strategy i, G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i s') i ≤ G.payoff σ i - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 6
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
- Used by 4
- IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
iplays it. - IsBestResponse.congr_payoffT1: Best response depends only on player
i's payoff column. - isNashEq_iffT6: The checker correctly decides Nash equilibrium (soundness and completeness).
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate.
- IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in /-- Player `i` is playing a best response to profile `σ` in game `G` if no unilateral deviation to any strategy `s'` yields a higher payoff. -/ def IsBestResponse (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) : Prop := ∀ s' : G.strategy i, G.payoff (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i s') i ≤ G.payoff σ i