IsESS.nash_condition
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
An ESS satisfies the symmetric Nash condition. [MSZ 5.51]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {S : Type*} {u : S → S → ℝ} in theorem IsESS.nash_condition {s : S} (h : IsESS u s) : ∀ t, u s s ≥ u t s
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `IsESS.nash_condition`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.IsESS.nash_condition← IsESS.nash_condition (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ESS.lean:70): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 1
- IsESSA strategy
sis an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if: 1.u(s,s) ≥ u(t,s)for allt(Nash condition) 2. Ifu(s,s) = u(t,s)…
- IsESSA strategy
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {S : Type*} {u : S → S → ℝ} in /-- An ESS satisfies the symmetric Nash condition. [MSZ 5.51] -/ theorem IsESS.nash_condition {s : S} (h : IsESS u s) : ∀ t, u s s ≥ u t s := h.1