IsESS
defimported Lean
A strategy s is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if: 1. u(s,s) ≥ u(t,s) for all t (Nash condition) 2. If u(s,s) = u(t,s) then u(s,t) > u(t,t) (invasion barrier) [MSZ 5.50]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in def IsESS {S : Type*} (u : S → S → ℝ) (s : S) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `IsESS`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.IsESS← IsESS (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ESS.lean:37): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 4
- IsESS.nash_conditionAn ESS satisfies the symmetric Nash condition. [MSZ 5.51]
- IsESS.strict_against_otherDistinct ESS are strictly separated: if
s ≠ tare both ESS, thenu(s,s) > u(t,s). - strict_nash_implies_essA strict symmetric Nash equilibrium is automatically ESS.
- IsESS.isNSSEvery ESS is neutrally stable.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- A strategy `s` is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if: 1. `u(s,s) ≥ u(t,s)` for all `t` (Nash condition) 2. If `u(s,s) = u(t,s)` then `u(s,t) > u(t,t)` (invasion barrier) [MSZ 5.50] -/ def IsESS {S : Type*} (u : S → S → ℝ) (s : S) : Prop := (∀ t, u s s ≥ u t s) ∧ (∀ t, u s s = u t s → s ≠ t → u s t > u t t)