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MatrixGame.minimax_theorem

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Von Neumann's Minimax Theorem: For any finite matrix game, maximin = minimax. [MSZ 5.11, von Neumann 1928] Proof: the general (positive-B) Loomis theorem specialised to B = 𝟙, exported as [Loomis.minmax_from_general] (compactness + continuity + strong induction on |I| + |J|). The field-generic minimax (any linearly ordered field, not just ℝ) is proved separately by von Neumann symmetrisation in [Minimax.minimax] — no compactness, no order completeness.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open MatrixGame in
open Finset BigOperators Matrix in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
theorem MatrixGame.minimax_theorem : A.maximin = A.minimax
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.minimax_theorem`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 5
  • Loomis.minmax_from_generalSimplified Loomis as a corollary of the general theorem: the finite von Neumann minimax MinimaxLoomis.lam0 A = MinimaxLoomis.mu0 A…
  • MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row i : I, Player II chooses column j : J. Payoff to Player I is g i j…
  • MatrixGame.maximinThe maximin value: the best guarantee Player I can achieve. maximin = sup_x inf_j E(x, j)
  • MatrixGame.minimaxThe minimax value: the best guarantee Player II can achieve. minimax = inf_y sup_i E(i, y)
  • Minimax.minimaxOrdered-field von Neumann minimax. Every finite two-player zero-sum game over a linearly ordered field has a value and optimal mixed…
Used by 2

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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open MatrixGame in
open Finset BigOperators Matrix in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
/-- **Von Neumann's Minimax Theorem**: For any finite matrix game, maximin = minimax. [MSZ 5.11, von Neumann 1928] Proof: the general (positive-`B`) Loomis theorem specialised to `B = 𝟙`, exported as [`Loomis.minmax_from_general`] (compactness + continuity + strong induction on `|I| + |J|`). The field-generic minimax (any linearly ordered field, not just ℝ) is proved separately by von Neumann symmetrisation in [`Minimax.minimax`] — no compactness, no order completeness. -/
theorem MatrixGame.minimax_theorem : A.maximin = A.minimax :=
  Loomis.minmax_from_general A.g
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