MatrixGame.minimax_theorem
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Von Neumann's Minimax Theorem: For any finite matrix game, maximin = minimax. [MSZ 5.11, von Neumann 1928] Proof: the general (positive-B) Loomis theorem specialised to B = 𝟙, exported as [Loomis.minmax_from_general] (compactness + continuity + strong induction on |I| + |J|). The field-generic minimax (any linearly ordered field, not just ℝ) is proved separately by von Neumann symmetrisation in [Minimax.minimax] — no compactness, no order completeness.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MatrixGame in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in theorem MatrixGame.minimax_theorem : A.maximin = A.minimax
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.minimax_theorem`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.minimax_theorem← MatrixGame.minimax_theorem (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGame.lean:205): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 5
- Loomis.minmax_from_generalSimplified Loomis as a corollary of the general theorem: the finite von Neumann minimax
MinimaxLoomis.lam0 A = MinimaxLoomis.mu0 A… - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - MatrixGame.maximinThe maximin value: the best guarantee Player I can achieve.
maximin = sup_x inf_j E(x, j) - MatrixGame.minimaxThe minimax value: the best guarantee Player II can achieve.
minimax = inf_y sup_i E(i, y) - Minimax.minimaxOrdered-field von Neumann minimax. Every finite two-player zero-sum game over a linearly ordered field has a value and optimal mixed…
- Loomis.minmax_from_generalSimplified Loomis as a corollary of the general theorem: the finite von Neumann minimax
- Used by 2
- MatrixGame.value_eq_minimaxMatrixGame.value_eq_minimax
- MatrixGame.common_guarantee_eq_valueCommon guarantee gives the value. If both players guarantee the same scalar
w, thenwequals the game value.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MatrixGame in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in /-- **Von Neumann's Minimax Theorem**: For any finite matrix game, maximin = minimax. [MSZ 5.11, von Neumann 1928] Proof: the general (positive-`B`) Loomis theorem specialised to `B = 𝟙`, exported as [`Loomis.minmax_from_general`] (compactness + continuity + strong induction on `|I| + |J|`). The field-generic minimax (any linearly ordered field, not just ℝ) is proved separately by von Neumann symmetrisation in [`Minimax.minimax`] — no compactness, no order completeness. -/ theorem MatrixGame.minimax_theorem : A.maximin = A.minimax := Loomis.minmax_from_general A.g